Apologies for the spam, for some reason I didn't see Rob's post in the
archives page on my computer but it shows ok now.
Thanks,
Dimitris.
On 5/7/2024 5:55 π.μ., Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
wrote:
Forwarding to the mailing list because it did not appear in the
archive
<https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-July/thread.html>.
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067
V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from
multiple Network Perspectives"
Date: Thu, 4 Jul 2024 09:27:16 +0000
From: Rob Stradling via Servercert-wg <[email protected]>
Reply-To: Rob Stradling <[email protected]>, CA/B Forum Server
Certificate WG Public Discussion List <[email protected]>
To: So, Nicol <[email protected]>, CA/B Forum Server Certificate
WG Public Discussion List <[email protected]>, Chris Clements
<[email protected]>
IANAL, but...
That patent <https://patents.google.com/patent/US11700263B2/en> was
filed on 2019-10-11.
The Princeton paper
<https://www.princeton.edu/~pmittal/publications/bgp-tls-usenix18.pdf> that
first highlighted the need for MPIC in the WebPKI dates back to
_2018_, and section 5.1.3 of that paper describes /"Let’s Encrypt’s
preliminary deployment of multiple vantage points in their staging
environment"/.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Servercert-wg <[email protected]> on behalf
of Chris Clements via Servercert-wg <[email protected]>
*Sent:* 01 July 2024 21:42
*To:* So, Nicol <[email protected]>; CA/B Forum Server
Certificate WG Public Discussion List <[email protected]>
*Subject:* Re: [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot
SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed
from multiple Network Perspectives"
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do
not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender
and know the content is safe.
All,
We have considered the communication from CommScope dated May 30, 2024.
We would like to proceed with a vote on Ballot SC-067 V3 on July 15,
2024. If any SCWG participant has questions regarding the
communication or the referenced patent, we encourage them to seek
legal counsel.
Thank you
-Chris
On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 4:50 PM So, Nicol via Servercert-wg
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I’ve come to be aware of a granted US patent that /seems/ relevant
to the subject matter of Ballot SC-067 V3. The patent is US
11700263 B2 [1]. I don’t know whether the patent has been
considered in previous discussions in the CA/B Forum or the SCWG,
but I thought I should bring it to the attention of SCWG members,
in case it has not.
If the patent has not been considered previously, I propose that
we extend the discussion period of this ballot so that members
have an opportunity to consult with their legal counsel for advice.
CommScope expresses no opinion on the patent, including but not
limited to its validity and whether it covers the practices
introduced in Ballot SC-067 V3.
Best regards,
Nicol So
CommScope
[1] https://patents.google.com/patent/US11700263B2/en
<https://patents.google.com/patent/US11700263B2/en>
*From:* Servercert-wg <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> *On Behalf Of *Chris
Clements via Servercert-wg
*Sent:* Monday, May 20, 2024 10:30 AM
*To:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
*Subject:* [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot
SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be
performed from multiple Network Perspectives"
*Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3*:
This Ballot proposes updates to the /Baseline Requirements for the
Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server
Certificates/ (i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective
Issuance Corroboration” (“MPIC”).
*Background*:
- MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from
multiple Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as
described within the Ballot for the applicable validation methods
in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5.
- Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5
will require using MPIC.
- This work was most recently motivated by research presented at
Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been
discussed for years prior as well.
- The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for
adversaries to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks
against the domain validation processes described in the TLS BRs.
- Additional background information can be found in an update
shared at Face-to-Face 60 [2].
*Benefits of Adoption*:
- Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool
domain control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which
led to the impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][4].
- Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of
global BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks
still pose a significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6].
- Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple
network perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet
substantially reduces the threat posed by equally-specific BGP
attacks, ensuring the integrity of domain validation and issuance
decisions [5][7][8].
- Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of
certificates a day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique
at Internet scale [7][9].
*Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure*:
- While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers
from Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided
academic expertise, and highlighted publicly-available
peer-reviewed research to support Members in drafting this ballot.
- The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not
filed for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan
to do so in the future.
- Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to
the CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber
inventions invented by researchers not involved in the development
of MPIC or with the CA/B Forum.
- Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR
statement. Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has
granted a worldwide royalty free license to the intellectual
property in MPIC developed by the researchers and has made
representations regarding its lack of knowledge of any other
Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC.
- The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in
Discussion Round 1.
- For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT
intended to replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton
to participate in the Forum in any capacity.
- Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should
consult their own counsel.
*Proposal Revision History*:
- Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader
Validation Subcommittee collaboration) [10]
- Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]
*Previous versions of this Ballot*:
- Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13].
Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are
updates made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069).
- Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15].
Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are
updates made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072).
*References*:
[1]
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf
<https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf>
[2]
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link
<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link>
[3]
https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600
<https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600>
[4] https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis
<https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis>
[5]
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski>
[6]
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf
<https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf>
[7]
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee>
[8]
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee>
[9]
https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html
<https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html>
[10] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6>
[11] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8>
[12] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487>
[13]
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5>
[14] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507>
[15]
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463>
The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan
Dickson of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron
Gable (ISRG / Let’s Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly).
*— Motion Begins —*
This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates”
(“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4.
MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following
Redline:
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463>
*— Motion Ends —*
This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure
for approval of this ballot is as follows:
*Discussion (at least 11 days)*
- Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC
- End no earlier than: 2024-05-31 14:30:00 UTC
*Vote for approval (7 days)*
- Start: TBD
- End: TBD
_______________________________________________
Servercert-wg mailing list
[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
<https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg>
_______________________________________________
Servercert-wg mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
_______________________________________________
Servercert-wg mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
