*wg chair hat off*
Rob Austein wrote:
Having thought about this a bit, I remain skeptical about the need for
or desirability of multiple signatures on ROAs.
First, as others have mentioned, this is a relatively low-probability
hypothetical case, and if it occurs at all it would be the result of
an issuer deliberately chosing to make life complicated for its
subjects. This does not strike me as a strong case for complicating
the protocol (if anything, it strikes me as the opposite, absent proof
that this complexity really is necessary).
Second, I don't see why this can't be handled via multiple ROAs
instead of multiple signatures on a single ROA. As I understand it,
relying parties in this system are going to have to deal with the
possibility of multiple ROAs for the same AS number in any case;
adding multiple signatures to ROAs will not change that.
So if seems to me that you are saying that an advertisement for
192.0.2.0/24 originated from AS65000 could be validated by two ROAs,
namely 192.0.2.0/25 authorizing AS65000 and 192.0.2.128/25 authorizing
AS65000
To me, this appears to make the relying party's job harder given that
the relying party is no longer just looking for either exact match ROAs
or covering aggregate ROAs but now also has to search for a collection
of more specific ROAs that could be used to construct an aggregate that
matches the prefix to be validated.
In your model does either of the signing /25 parties need to demonstate
knowledge of the other? Do they need to indicate their permission to
have the aggregated originated rather than the more specific? How can
they demonstrate that they are in effect the same party even though
there may be different validation paths for the certs associated with
each more prefix? How can a validating party uncover the original intent
of the signers in this case?
So, since on the one hand this whole mess can be avoided by an issuer
who wants to avoid it, and on the other hand there's a perfectly good
way to handle it that we're going to have to support anyway, on the
gripping hand I do not support the proposed change to allow multiple
signatures.
I don't agree with this assessment and to me ruling out the ability of
multiple signatures on a ROA introduces the potential for undue levels
of uncertainty in relying party validation of route objects. For that
reason I continue to support the concept of allowing multiple signatures
on a ROAs.
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