On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote:
> Hi Sandra, > > Thanks for the reply. You put forward the all the points correctly and > precisely. > > My concern is that, unlike the normal PKI model where the final output > is to authenticate the user using the just the certificate, the > Routing based model we are now talking about verifying just a small > bit of information which is used for the BGP Best Path selection - the > sanity of which we are trying to protect, and protecting just the > Origin does not make sense in a malicious case at all. Though you may > say that it protects in case the malicious person plays with the > Origin attribute, it however does not protect much as with the same > amount of effort a malicious person can still cause the same attacks. > What increases is the over head in each of the domains to maintain the > new PKI information. > (Yes, I know I already replied to this message, but to a different point and I wanted to keep them separate.) When I say origination of route advertisements, I am not talking about the ORIGIN attribute in the BGP Update. I am talking about an ISP that creates a BGP Update that has an AS_PATH containing only its AS number. That is the point at which a route is first advertised into the BGP system. I'm talking about an action, not a protocol field. It is indeed possible for a route to modify attributes other than the AS_PATH. But many of those (local preference, community strings, etc) have only local significance. And as we have seen, bogus AS_PATHs have a whole lot of impact. --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
