Hi John,
While I appreciate the work by Steve here to allow a relying party to
put on the rose coloured validation glasses, it is an inside view
looking out. That means is allows an organisation to locally say what
it believes is the RPKI view of the world irrespective of what is said
globally.
So it certainly has its place - but doesn't address David's position
completely where an organisation, such as the UK government, might
wish to validly assert their own independent trust anchor for their
51/8 SIDR hierarchy and have the rest of the relying parties on the
internet collect it and validate routes against it. Perhaps some focus
needs to be placed on truly dealing with multiple (>6) trust anchors
in a sense where some globally recognised trust anchor repository
might exist and TAs are vetted for correctness of both the TA's 3779
extensions and the organisation mooting ownership in some open,
transparent, and unbiased mode. In this fashion, if an organisation
(say UK) did wish to secede from RIPE, they could still be a party to
the global (trusted) routing system by having their own valid and
recognised TA.
Cheers
Terry
On 15/09/2009, at 6:05 AM, John Schnizlein wrote:
David,
What you may be looking for is Steve Kent's Trust Anchor Management
presentation (and the errata slide 13) - the last items in the SIDR
materials from IETF 75.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/75/materials.html
John
On 2009Sep14, at 3:58 PM, David Conrad wrote:
With SIDR, again as I understand it (and I'm looking forward to
being corrected), the idea is to have 1 or 5 or 6 trust anchors
that are administered by the allocating authorities who both manage
the top-level as well as control the top-level.
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