Terry, see below...
Terry manderson wrote:
On 06/10/2009, at 11:28 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
So legitimate transfers will breed duplicates? My recollection of
that discussion that there would be timing in place that certificate
validity times would be tuned (with sparse use of CRLs) to effect the
transfers. Or am I mistaken?
I have been told that it is likely that certs issued in conjunction
with transfers will overlap in validity intervals.
so two organisations, at some point in time, will have the ability to
issue valid and conflicting statements.
They have that ability today, it is being used and it's useful. Would you
want to take that ability away from them, should they want to use RPKI?
I think that is really hairy. I can guess it was for the concern of
maintaining connectivity, ie not creating break scenarios. But to me it
appears to muddy the water. Surely there are better ways to achieve a
low impact transfer? ie place an embargo on ROA/BOA creation for a time
slice either side of the transfer. That would have the effect of
degrading the trust statement, but not conflicting it nor breaking
routing, for the period of transfer.. But still allows a clear
delineation of 'ownership'.
Suppose you're ISP1, and want to sell some part of your clients to ISP2
(this happens: mergers, splits, you name it). In other words, you want to
transfer a live, routed and used chunk of space to another party. How would
you execute this while ROAs are in place? If you think about it you'll
realize that there have to be multiple ROAs which overlap in terms of
validity time, otherwise you introduce exact timing, which sounds pretty
difficult to execute with 30K+ participants.
Of course the whole story is a lot easier if you don't need to keep the
network alive.
Robert
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