The problem is the possibility that not accommodating legitimate BGP
updates might result in opportunities for bad guys to get around
protections.
So we need to have some statement of what to do with this legitimate
BGP update format. And we need some certainty that we aren't introducing
opportuntities to circumvent the protections of ordinary updates.
Protecting the AS_SETs etc is out of scope.
--Sandy
On Wed, 28 Jul 2010, Randy Bush wrote:
want knob to just not bother with aggs. they are a teensie weensie bit
of the routes, often bizarre (have only self, have three copies of self,
private asns, ...), why should i pay with complexity (== fragility) to
accommodate them?
randy
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