> At this point, the deployment model that appears to be documented > (Section 8) seems to presume that it's okay to have inconsistent RPKI > policy within a provider. If everyone is cool with that, we're done.
there is no rpki policy in this document. hence such policies can not be inconsistent. Abstract In order to formally validate the origin ASes of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] or analogous prefix origin data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin data to routers over ssh. i encourage you to describe and document a protocol which maintains synchronized and skew-free trusted caches. sorry, i did not know how, and did not think it was actually needed or appropriate in this context. randy _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
