A significant portion of the SIDR ROA-Format draft is spent specifying
the ASN.1 syntax for the CMS encapsulation of the ROA object. (Note also
that the SIDR manifest document also includes this ASN.1 syntax for an
identical CMS encapsulation.)
It was suggested to the authors of the ROA Format draft that the
specification of any future RPKI signed objects would be made much
simpler if we split the specification of the CMS encapsulation (which
pertains to all RPKI signed objects) off from the stuff that is
ROA-specific.
Therefore, we have produced the two attached drafts for your consideration:
draft-achi-rpki-signed-object is a generic template designed to simplify
the specification of RPKI signed objects.
Note that to instantiate the template and create a new type of RPKI
signed object all you have to do is:
1. Get an OID to identify the ContentType for the new type of
signed object
2. Specify the ASN.1 syntax for the content of the new type of
signed object
3. Specify any additional steps that are required for validating
the new type of signed object (beyond the standard steps required for
all RPKI signed objects which are specified in the rpki-signed-object
draft)
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format is a much shorter version of the roa-format
draft which makes use of the generic signed object template and thus
only specifies the ROA-specific stuff (that is, the three things I noted
above).
Note that breaking up the ROA-format document in this fashion in no way
changes the syntax or semantics of a ROA (i.e., nothing has changes
besides the manner of documentation).
Please take a look at these documents and let us know if this is a good
way forward. (If it is a good way forward we can easily change [i.e.,
shorten] the manifest document to use this signed-object template as well.)
- Matt Lepinski
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) M. Lepinski
Internet Draft S. Kent
Expires: February 20, 2011 D. Kong
Intended Status: Proposed Standard BBN Technologies
August 20, 2010
A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-08.txt
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
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authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to that one
or more prefixes within the address block.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2
2. Basic Format........................Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1. Signed-Data Content Type.......Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.1. version...................Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.2. digestAlgorithms..........Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.3. encapContentInfo..........Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.3.1. eContentType.........Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.3.2. eContent.............Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.3.2.1. version....................................4
2.1.3.2.2. asID.......................................4
2.1.3.2.3. ipAddrBlocks...............................4
2.1.4. certificates..............Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.5. crls......................Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.6. signerInfos...............Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.6.1. version..............Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.6.2. sid..................Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.6.3. digestAlgorithm......Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.6.4. signedAttrs..........Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.6.4.1. ContentType Attribute....Error! Bookmark not
defined.
2.1.6.4.2. MessageDigest Attribute..Error! Bookmark not
defined.
2.1.6.4.3. SigningTime Attribute....Error! Bookmark not
defined.
2.1.6.4.4. BinarySigningTimeAttributeError! Bookmark not
defined.
2.1.6.5. signatureAlgorithm...Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.6.6. signature............Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1.6.7. unsignedAttrs........Error! Bookmark not defined.
3. ROA Validation.................................................5
4. Security Considerations........................................6
5. IANA Considerations............................................6
6. Acknowledgments................................................6
7. References.....................................................7
7.1. Normative References......................................7
7.2. Informative References....................................7
Authors' Addresses................................................8
Intellectual Property Statement...................................8
Disclaimer of Validity............................................8
Copyright Statement...............................................8
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1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Internet IP Address and AS Number Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system is to improve routing
security. As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow
entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP
address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes
within that block. A ROA provides this function.
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[SIGN-OBJ], which defines a CMS wrapper for the ROA content as well
as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore,
to complete the specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [SIGN-
OBJ]), this document defines:
1. The OID that identifies the signed object as being a
ROA. (This
OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo
object as well as the ContentType signed attribute in the
signerInfo object.)
2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the
payload
that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as
well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.)
3. An additional step required to validate ROAs (in
addition to
the validation steps specified in [SIGN-OBJ]).
1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
2. The ROA ContentType
The ContentType for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAttestation and
has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.
This OID must appear both within the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute
in the signerInfo object (see [SIGN-OBJ]).
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3. The ROA eContent
The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized
by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or
more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address
space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same
set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS
number. A ROA is formally defined as:
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASID ::= INTEGER
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
addresses SEQUENCE OF ROAIPAddress }
ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
address IPAddress,
maxLength INTEGER OPTIONAL }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
encapContentInfo (see [SIGN-OBJ]).
3.1. version
The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0.
3.2. asID
The asID field contains the AS number that is authorized to originate
routes to the given IP address prefixes.
3.3. ipAddrBlocks
The ipAddrBlocks field encodes the set of IP address prefixes to
which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax
here is more restrictive than that used in the IP Address Delegation
extension defined in RFC 3779. That extension can represent arbitrary
address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only prefixes.
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Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, addressFamily contains the
Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This
specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6. Therefore, addressFamily
MUST be either 0001 or 0002.
Within a ROAIPAddress structure, the addresses field represents
prefixes as a sequence of type IPAddress. (See [RFC3779] for more
details). If present, the maxLength must be an integer greater than
or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix and less than or
equal to the length (in bits) of an IP address in the address family
(32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). When present, the maxLength specifies
the maximum length of IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to
advertise. (For example, if the IP Address prefix is 10.0/16 and the
maxLength is 24, the AS is authorized to advertise any more specific
prefix having length at most 24. That is, in this example, the AS
would be authorized to advertise 10.0/16, 10.0.128/20, or
10.0.255/24, but not 10.0.255.0/25.) When the maxLength is not
present, the AS is only authorized to advertise exactly the prefix
specified in the ROA.
Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP Address prefix (within a
ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP Address
prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA
may contain the prefix 10.0/16 with maxLength 18, as well as the
prefix 10.0.0/24 with maxLength 24. (Such a ROA would authorize the
indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 10.0 with length
at least 16 and no greater than 18, as well as the specific prefix
10.0.0/24.) Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements
where the IP Address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this
is NOT RECOMMENDED as in such a case the ROAIPAddress with the
shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS
and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.
4. ROA Validation
Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing
announcement, the relying party must first validate the ROA. To
validate a ROA the relying party MUST perform all the validation
checks specified in [SIGN-OBJ] as well as the following additional
ROA-specific validation step.
1. The IP Address Delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the EE
certificate (contained within the ROA) and each IP address
prefix(es) in ROA is contained within the set of IP addresses
specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension.
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5. Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it
is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are
accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is
no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used
for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
Although the ROA is a signed, application layer object, there is no
intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.
The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to
originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus the integrity of
a ROA must be established. The ROA makes use of the CMS signed
message format for integrity, and thus inherits the security
considerations associated with that data structure. The right of the
ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the
prefix(es) is established through use of the address space and AS
number PKI described in [ARCH]. Specifically one must verify the
signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this
PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA match those in the
address space extension in the certificate.
6. IANA Considerations
None.
7. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Charles Gardiner and Russ Housley for their
help and contributions. Additionally, the authors would like to thank
Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson and Sam Weiler for their
careful reviews and helpful comments.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3852, July
2004.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and Seo, K., "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[ALGS] Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use
in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", draft-ietf-
sidr-rpki-alg, May 2010
[RESCERT] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res-
certs, May 2010.
[SIGNOBJ] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and Kent, S., "Generic Signed
Objects for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", draft-
achi-rpki-signed-object, August 2010.
8.2. Informative References
[ARCH] Lepinski, M. and Kent, S., "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing," draft-ietf-sidr-arch, July 2010.
[CP] Seo, K., et. al., "A Certificate Policy for the Resource
PKI," draft-ietf-sidr-cp, July 2010.
[REPOS] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", draft-ietf-
sidr-repos-struct, May 2010.
[RFC4049] Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternative Format for
Representing Time in ASN.1," RFC 4049, April 2005.
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Authors' Addresses
Matt Lepinski
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
Email: [email protected]
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
Email: [email protected]
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
Email: [email protected]
Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Lepinski, Kent and Kong Expires February 2011 [Page 8]
Secure Inter-Domain Routing M. Lepinski
Internet-Draft A. Chi
Intended status: Standards Track S. Kent
Expires: February 21, 2011 BBN
August 20, 2010
Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
draft-achi-rpki-signed-object-00.txt
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 21, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Abstract
This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in
the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. These RPKI signed objects
make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard
encapsulation format.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Note on Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Signed Object Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Signed-Data Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. digestAlgorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.3. encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3.1. eContentType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3.2. eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.4. certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.5. crls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.6. signerInfos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.6.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.6.2. sid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.6.3. digestAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.6.4. signedAttrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.6.4.1. Content-Type Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.6.4.2. Message-Digest Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.6.4.3. SigningTime Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.6.4.4. BinarySigningTime Attribute . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.6.5. signatureAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.6.6. signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.6.7. unsignedAttrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Signed Object Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Definition of Specific Signed Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
The purpose of the Internet IP Address and AS Number Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system is to support assertions by current
resource holders of IP (v4 and v6) address space and AS numbers,
based on the records of the organizations that act as CAs. IP
address and AS number resource information is carried in X.509
certificates via RFC 3779 extensions [I-D.sidr-res-certs]. Other
information assertions about resources are expressed via digitally
signed, non-X.509 data structures that are referred to as "signed
objects" in the RPKI context [I-D.sidr-arch]. This document
standardizes a template for specifying signed objects that can be
validated using the RPKI.
RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652] as a standard encapsulation format. CMS was chosen to take
advantage of existing open source software available for processing
messages in this format. RPKI signed objects adhere to a profile
(specified in Section 2) of the CMS signed-data object.
The template defined in this document for RPKI signed objects is not
a complete specification for any particular type of signed object,
and instead includes only the items which are common to all RPKI
signed objects. That is, fully specifying a particular type of signed
object requires an additional document that specifies the details
which are specific to a particular type of signed object (such as
ASN.1 syntax for the object's payload and any additional steps
required to validate the particular type of signed object). Section 4
describes in more detail the additional pieces that must be specified
in order to define a new type of RPKI signed object that uses this
template. Additionally, see [draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format] for an
example of a document that uses this template to specify a particular
type of signed object, the Route Origination Authorization.
1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
1.2. Note on Algorithms
Cryptographic Message Syntax is a general format capable of
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accommodating a wide variety of signature and digest algorithms. The
algorithms used in the RPKI (and associated key sizes) are specified
in [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].
2. Signed Object Syntax
The RPKI signed object is a profile of the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] signed-data object. The general format of a
CMS object is:
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
The ContentType is the signed-data type of id-data, namely the id-
signedData OID, 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2. [RFC5652]
2.1. Signed-Data Content Type
According to the CMS standard, the signed-data content type is the
ASN.1 type SignedData:
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SignerInfos }
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo
Additionally, the SignerInfos set must contain only a single
SignerInfo object.
2.1.1. version
The version is the syntax version number. It MUST be 3,
corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version number 3.
2.1.2. digestAlgorithms
The digestAlgorithms set contains the OIDs of the digest algorithm(s)
used in signing the encapsulated content. This set MUST contain
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exactly one digest algorithm OID, and the OID MUST be selected from
those specified in [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].
2.1.3. encapContentInfo
encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type
identifier and the content itself. The encapContentInfo represents
the payload of the RPKI signed object.
EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
eContentType ContentType,
eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
2.1.3.1. eContentType
This field is left undefined by this profile. The eContentType is an
OID specifying the type of payload in this signed object and MUST be
specified by the document that defines the object.
2.1.3.2. eContent
This field is left partially undefined by this profile. The eContent
is the payload of the signed object and MUST be specified by the
document that defines the RPKI object.
At the outermost level, the eContent field MUST be an ASN.1 SEQUENCE.
The first element of the sequence MUST be the version number, in
order to enable transition to new versions of signed objects over
time.
ContentTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
... }
The document that defines the specific RPKI object MUST specify the
remaining fields, represented as ellipses (...).
2.1.4. certificates
The certificates field MUST be included, and MUST contain exactly one
certificate, RPKI EE certificate needed to validate this signed
object.
2.1.5. crls
The crls field MUST be omitted.
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2.1.6. signerInfos
SignerInfo is defined under CMS as:
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }
2.1.6.1. version
The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice of
SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid.
2.1.6.2. sid
The sid is defined as:
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }
For RPKI signed objects, the sid MUST be the SubjectKeyIdentifier
that appears in the EE certificate carried in the CMS certificates
field.
2.1.6.3. digestAlgorithm
The digestAlgorithm MUST consist of the OID of a digest algorithm
that conforms to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile
specification [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].
2.1.6.4. signedAttrs
The signedAttrs is defined as:
SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }
AttributeValue ::= ANY
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The signedAttr element MUST be present and MUST include the content-
type and message-digest attributes. The signer MAY also include the
signing-time signed attribute, the binary-signing-time signed
attribute, or both signing-time attributes. Other signed attributes
MUST NOT be included.
The signedAttr MUST include only a single instance of any particular
attribute. Additionally, even though the syntax allows for a SET OF
AttributeValue, in an RPKI signed object the attrValues MUST consist
of only a single AttributeValue.
2.1.6.4.1. Content-Type Attribute
The ContentType attribute MUST be present. The attrType OID for the
ContentType attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3.
The attrValues for the ContentType attribute MUST match the
eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo. Thus, attrValues must
contain the OID that specifies the payload type of the specific RPKI
signed object carried in the CMS signed data structure.
2.1.6.4.2. Message-Digest Attribute
The MessageDigest Attribute MUST be present. The attrType OID for
the MessageDigest Attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4.
The attrValues for the MessageDigest attribute contains the output of
the digest algorithm applied to the content being signed, as
specified in Section 11.1 of [RFC5652].
2.1.6.4.3. SigningTime Attribute
The SigningTime Attribute MAY be present. Note that the presence or
absence of the SigningTime attribute MUST NOT affect the validity of
the signed object (as specified in Section 3). The attrType OID for
the SigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5.
id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 }
The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is defined as:
SigningTime ::= Time
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }
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The Time element specifies the time, based on the local system clock,
at which the digital signature was applied to the content.
The definition of Time matches the one specified in the 1997 version
of X.509. Additional information regarding the use of UTCTime and
GeneralizedTime can be found in [RFC5652].
2.1.6.4.4. BinarySigningTime Attribute
The BinarySigningTime Attribute MAY be present. Note that the
presence or absence of the BinarySigningTime attribute in no way
affects the validity of the signed object (as specified in Section
3). The attrType OID for the SigningTime attribute is
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46.
id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 46 }
The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is defined as:
BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime
BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based on the local system
clock, at which the digital signature was applied to the content. The
precise definition of the BinaryTime element can be found in
[RFC4049].
2.1.6.5. signatureAlgorithm
The signatureAlgorithm MUST conform to the RPKI Algorithms and Key
Size Profile specification [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].
2.1.6.6. signature
The signature value is defined as:
SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and signature
algorithms.
2.1.6.7. unsignedAttrs
unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.
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3. Signed Object Validation
Before a relying party can use a signed object, the relying party
MUST validate the signed object by verifying that all of the
following conditions hold. A relying party may perform these checks
in any order. Note that these checks are necessary but not
sufficient: in general, further validation MUST be performed based on
the specific type of signed object.
1. The signed object syntax complies with this specification. In
particular, that each of the following is true:
a. The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)
b. The version of the SignedData object is 3.
c. The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
and contains one EE certificate, the Subject Key Identifier
(SKI) field of which matches the sid field of the SignerInfo
object.
d. The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.
e. The version of the SignerInfo is 3.
f. The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and
contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.4).
g. The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is an OID
that matches the attrValues in the ContentType attribute.
h. The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted.
i. The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData and SignerInfo objects
conforms to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile
specification [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].
j. The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object conforms to
the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile specification
[I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].
2. The public key of the EE certificate (contained within the CMS
signed-data object) can be used to successfully verify the
signature on the signed object.
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3. The EE certificate (contained within the CMS signed-data object)
is a valid end-entity certificate in the resource PKI as
specified by [I-D.sidr-res-certs]. In particular, there exists a
valid certification path from a trust anchor to this EE
certificate.
If the above procedure indicates that the signed object is invalid,
then the signed object MUST be discarded and treated as though no
signed object were present. If the all of the conditions above are
true, then the signed object may be valid. The relying party MUST
then perform any additional validation steps required for the
particular type of signed object.
4. Definition of Specific Signed Objects
Each RPKI signed object MUST be defined based on this profile, by
specifying the following data elements and validation procedure:
1. eContentType: Obtain an OID to be used for the eContentType
field in encapContentInfo. This OID uniquely identifies the type
of signed object.
2. eContent: Define an ASN.1 syntax for the eContent field in
encapContentInfo. The syntax must consist of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE
whose first element is "version" expressed as an ASN.1 INTEGER.
3. Content-Type Attribute: The mandatory Content-Type Attribute
must have its attrValues field set to the same OID as
eContentType in item 1.
4. Additional Validation: Define a set of additional validation
steps for the specific signed object. Before using this specific
signed object, a relying party MUST perform both the generic
validation steps in Section 3 above, as well as these additional
steps.
5. Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in an RPKI
signed object. The integrity and authenticity of each signed
object is based on the verification of a digital signature for
the object, and on the validation of the EE certificate used to
perform that verification. It is anticipated that signed objects
will be stored in repositories that will be publicly accessible.
6. IANA Considerations
None.
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7. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, and
Derek Kong for their help and contributions. Additionally, the
authors would like to thank Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny
McPherson and Sam Weiler for their careful reviews and helpful
comments.
8. Normative References
[I-D.sidr-arch] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to
Support Secure Internet Routing",
draft-ietf-sidr-arch-09.txt (work in progress), October
2009.
[I-D.sidr-res-certs] Huston, G., Michaleson, G., and R. Loomans, "A
Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-18.txt (work in progress), May
2010.
[I-D.sidr-rpki-algs] Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key
Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-huston-sidr-rpki-algs-00.txt (work in progress),
July 2009.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
5652, September 2009.
9. Informative References
[RFC4049] Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternate Format for
Representing Date and Time in ASN.1", RFC 4049, April
2005.
Authors' Addresses
Matt Lepinski
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
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Email: [email protected]
Andrew Chi
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
Email: [email protected]
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
Email: [email protected]
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