A significant portion of the SIDR ROA-Format draft is spent specifying the ASN.1 syntax for the CMS encapsulation of the ROA object. (Note also that the SIDR manifest document also includes this ASN.1 syntax for an identical CMS encapsulation.)

It was suggested to the authors of the ROA Format draft that the specification of any future RPKI signed objects would be made much simpler if we split the specification of the CMS encapsulation (which pertains to all RPKI signed objects) off from the stuff that is ROA-specific.

Therefore, we have produced the two attached drafts for your consideration:

draft-achi-rpki-signed-object is a generic template designed to simplify the specification of RPKI signed objects. Note that to instantiate the template and create a new type of RPKI signed object all you have to do is: 1. Get an OID to identify the ContentType for the new type of signed object 2. Specify the ASN.1 syntax for the content of the new type of signed object 3. Specify any additional steps that are required for validating the new type of signed object (beyond the standard steps required for all RPKI signed objects which are specified in the rpki-signed-object draft)

draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format is a much shorter version of the roa-format draft which makes use of the generic signed object template and thus only specifies the ROA-specific stuff (that is, the three things I noted above).

Note that breaking up the ROA-format document in this fashion in no way changes the syntax or semantics of a ROA (i.e., nothing has changes besides the manner of documentation).

Please take a look at these documents and let us know if this is a good way forward. (If it is a good way forward we can easily change [i.e., shorten] the manifest document to use this signed-object template as well.)

- Matt Lepinski
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                          M. Lepinski
Internet Draft                                                  S. Kent
Expires: February 20, 2011                                      D. Kong
Intended Status: Proposed Standard                     BBN Technologies
                                                        August 20, 2010
                                      
             A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) 
                     draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-08.txt 


Status of this Memo 

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the 
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that 
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts. 

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2011. 

Copyright Notice 

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 
   document authors.  All rights reserved. 

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of 
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). 
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 
   and restrictions with respect to this document. 

Abstract 

   This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin 
   Authorizations (ROAs).  A ROA is a digitally signed object that 
   provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has 
 
 
 
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   authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to that one 
   or more prefixes within the address block.  

Table of Contents 

    
   1. Introduction...................................................2 
   2. Basic Format........................Error! Bookmark not defined. 
      2.1. Signed-Data Content Type.......Error! Bookmark not defined. 
         2.1.1. version...................Error! Bookmark not defined. 
         2.1.2. digestAlgorithms..........Error! Bookmark not defined. 
         2.1.3. encapContentInfo..........Error! Bookmark not defined. 
            2.1.3.1. eContentType.........Error! Bookmark not defined. 
            2.1.3.2. eContent.............Error! Bookmark not defined. 
               2.1.3.2.1. version....................................4 
               2.1.3.2.2. asID.......................................4 
               2.1.3.2.3. ipAddrBlocks...............................4 
         2.1.4. certificates..............Error! Bookmark not defined. 
         2.1.5. crls......................Error! Bookmark not defined. 
         2.1.6. signerInfos...............Error! Bookmark not defined. 
            2.1.6.1. version..............Error! Bookmark not defined. 
            2.1.6.2. sid..................Error! Bookmark not defined. 
            2.1.6.3. digestAlgorithm......Error! Bookmark not defined. 
            2.1.6.4. signedAttrs..........Error! Bookmark not defined. 
               2.1.6.4.1. ContentType Attribute....Error! Bookmark not 
               defined. 
               2.1.6.4.2. MessageDigest Attribute..Error! Bookmark not 
               defined. 
               2.1.6.4.3. SigningTime Attribute....Error! Bookmark not 
               defined. 
               2.1.6.4.4. BinarySigningTimeAttributeError! Bookmark not 
               defined. 
            2.1.6.5. signatureAlgorithm...Error! Bookmark not defined. 
            2.1.6.6. signature............Error! Bookmark not defined. 
            2.1.6.7. unsignedAttrs........Error! Bookmark not defined. 
   3. ROA Validation.................................................5 
   4. Security Considerations........................................6 
   5. IANA Considerations............................................6 
   6. Acknowledgments................................................6 
   7. References.....................................................7 
      7.1. Normative References......................................7 
      7.2. Informative References....................................7 
   Authors' Addresses................................................8 
   Intellectual Property Statement...................................8 
   Disclaimer of Validity............................................8 
   Copyright Statement...............................................8 
    
 
 
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1. Introduction 

   The primary purpose of the Internet IP Address and AS Number Resource 
   Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system is to improve routing 
   security.  As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow 
   entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP 
   address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes 
   within that block.  A ROA provides this function. 

   The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects 
   [SIGN-OBJ], which defines a CMS wrapper for the ROA content as well 
   as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, 
   to complete the specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [SIGN-
   OBJ]), this document defines: 

      1.               The OID that identifies the signed object as being a 
ROA. (This 
         OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo 
         object as well as the ContentType signed attribute in the 
         signerInfo object.) 

      2.               The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the 
payload 
         that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as 
         well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) 

      3.               An additional step required to validate ROAs (in 
addition to 
         the validation steps specified in [SIGN-OBJ]).  

1.1. Terminology 

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509 
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779]. 

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. 

    
2. The ROA ContentType 

   The ContentType for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAttestation and 
   has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24. 

   This OID must appear both within the eContentType in the 
   encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute 
   in the signerInfo object (see [SIGN-OBJ]). 
 
 
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3. The ROA eContent 

   The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized 
   by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or 
   more IP address prefixes that will be advertised.  If the address 
   space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same 
   set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS 
   number. A ROA is formally defined as: 

      RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { 
         version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, 
         asID  ASID, 
         ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE OF ROAIPAddressFamily } 
     
      ASID ::= INTEGER 
       
      ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { 
         addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)), 
         addresses SEQUENCE OF ROAIPAddress } 

    
      ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE { 
         address IPAddress, 
         maxLength INTEGER OPTIONAL } 
    
      IPAddress ::= BIT STRING 

   Note that this content appears as the eContent within the 
   encapContentInfo (see [SIGN-OBJ]). 

3.1. version 

   The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0. 

3.2. asID 

   The asID field contains the AS number that is authorized to originate 
   routes to the given IP address prefixes. 

3.3. ipAddrBlocks 

   The ipAddrBlocks field encodes the set of IP address prefixes to 
   which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax 
   here is more restrictive than that used in the IP Address Delegation 
   extension defined in RFC 3779. That extension can represent arbitrary 
   address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only prefixes. 

 
 
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   Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, addressFamily contains the 
   Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This 
   specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6. Therefore, addressFamily 
   MUST be either 0001 or 0002.  

   Within a ROAIPAddress structure, the addresses field represents 
   prefixes as a sequence of type IPAddress. (See [RFC3779] for more 
   details). If present, the maxLength must be an integer greater than 
   or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix and less than or 
   equal to the length (in bits) of an IP address in the address family 
   (32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). When present, the maxLength specifies 
   the maximum length of IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to 
   advertise. (For example, if the IP Address prefix is 10.0/16 and the 
   maxLength is 24, the AS is authorized to advertise any more specific 
   prefix having length at most 24. That is, in this example, the AS 
   would be authorized to advertise 10.0/16, 10.0.128/20, or 
   10.0.255/24, but not 10.0.255.0/25.) When the maxLength is not 
   present, the AS is only authorized to advertise exactly the prefix 
   specified in the ROA. 

   Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP Address prefix (within a 
   ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP Address 
   prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA 
   may contain the prefix 10.0/16 with maxLength 18, as well as the 
   prefix 10.0.0/24 with maxLength 24. (Such a ROA would authorize the 
   indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 10.0 with length 
   at least 16 and no greater than 18, as well as the specific prefix 
   10.0.0/24.) Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements 
   where the IP Address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this 
   is NOT RECOMMENDED as in such a case the ROAIPAddress with the 
   shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS 
   and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA. 

4. ROA Validation 

   Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing 
   announcement, the relying party must first validate the ROA. To 
   validate a ROA the relying party MUST perform all the validation 
   checks specified in [SIGN-OBJ] as well as the following additional 
   ROA-specific validation step. 

   1. The IP Address Delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the EE 
      certificate (contained within the ROA) and each IP address 
      prefix(es) in ROA is contained within the set of IP addresses 
      specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension.   


 
 
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5. Security Considerations 

   There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it 
   is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are 
   accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is 
   no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used 
   for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. 
   Although the ROA is a signed, application layer object, there is no 
   intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.  
    
   The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to 
   originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus the integrity of 
   a ROA must be established. The ROA makes use of the CMS signed 
   message format for integrity, and thus inherits the security 
   considerations associated with that data structure. The right of the 
   ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the 
   prefix(es) is established through use of the address space and AS 
   number PKI described in [ARCH]. Specifically one must verify the 
   signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this 
   PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA match those in the 
   address space extension in the certificate.  

6. IANA Considerations 

   None. 

7. Acknowledgments 

   The authors wish to thank Charles Gardiner and Russ Housley for their 
   help and contributions. Additionally, the authors would like to thank 
   Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson and Sam Weiler for their 
   careful reviews and helpful comments. 















 
 
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8. References 

8.1. Normative References 

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 

   [RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3852, July 
             2004.    

   [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and Seo, K., "X.509 Extensions for IP 
             Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 

   [ALGS]    Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use 
             in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", draft-ietf-
             sidr-rpki-alg, May 2010 

   [RESCERT] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., "A Profile for 
             X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res-
             certs, May 2010. 

   [SIGNOBJ] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and Kent, S., "Generic Signed 
             Objects for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", draft-
             achi-rpki-signed-object, August 2010. 

    

8.2. Informative References 

   [ARCH]    Lepinski, M. and Kent, S., "An Infrastructure to Support 
             Secure Internet Routing," draft-ietf-sidr-arch, July 2010. 

   [CP]      Seo, K., et. al., "A Certificate Policy for the Resource 
             PKI," draft-ietf-sidr-cp, July 2010. 

   [REPOS]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., "A Profile for 
             Resource Certificate Repository Structure", draft-ietf-
             sidr-repos-struct, May 2010. 

   [RFC4049] Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternative Format for 
             Representing Time in ASN.1," RFC 4049, April 2005. 

    

    

    
 
 
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Authors' Addresses

   Matt Lepinski
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   
   Email: [email protected]
    
   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   
   Email: [email protected]
    
   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   
   Email: [email protected]
    

    

 Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer 

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF 
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November 
   10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this 
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow 
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. 
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling 
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified 
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may 
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format 
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other 
   than English. 
 
 
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Secure Inter-Domain Routing                                  M. Lepinski
Internet-Draft                                                    A. Chi
Intended status: Standards Track                                 S. Kent
Expires: February 21, 2011                                           BBN
                                                         August 20, 2010


   Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
                  draft-achi-rpki-signed-object-00.txt

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 21, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Abstract

   This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in
   the Resource Public Key Infrastructure.  These RPKI signed objects
   make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard
   encapsulation format.
 


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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
      1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
      1.2. Note on Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2. Signed Object Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
      2.1. Signed-Data Content Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
         2.1.1. version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
         2.1.2. digestAlgorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
         2.1.3. encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
            2.1.3.1. eContentType  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
            2.1.3.2. eContent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
         2.1.4. certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
         2.1.5. crls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
         2.1.6. signerInfos  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
            2.1.6.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
            2.1.6.2. sid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
            2.1.6.3. digestAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
            2.1.6.4. signedAttrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
               2.1.6.4.1. Content-Type Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 7
               2.1.6.4.2. Message-Digest Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 7
               2.1.6.4.3. SigningTime Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . 7
               2.1.6.4.4. BinarySigningTime Attribute  . . . . . . . . 8
            2.1.6.5. signatureAlgorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
            2.1.6.6. signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
            2.1.6.7. unsignedAttrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   3. Signed Object Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
   4. Definition of Specific Signed Objects  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11














 


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1. Introduction

   The purpose of the Internet IP Address and AS Number Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system is to support assertions by current
   resource holders of IP (v4 and v6) address space and AS numbers,
   based on the records of the organizations that act as CAs.  IP
   address and AS number resource information is carried in X.509
   certificates via RFC 3779 extensions [I-D.sidr-res-certs].  Other
   information assertions about resources are expressed via digitally
   signed, non-X.509 data structures that are referred to as "signed
   objects" in the RPKI context [I-D.sidr-arch].  This document
   standardizes a template for specifying signed objects that can be
   validated using the RPKI.

   RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
   [RFC5652] as a standard encapsulation format.  CMS was chosen to take
   advantage of existing open source software available for processing
   messages in this format.  RPKI signed objects adhere to a profile
   (specified in Section 2) of the CMS signed-data object.

   The template defined in this document for RPKI signed objects is not
   a complete specification for any particular type of signed object,
   and instead includes only the items which are common to all RPKI
   signed objects. That is, fully specifying a particular type of signed
   object requires an additional document that specifies the details
   which are specific to a particular type of signed object (such as
   ASN.1 syntax for the object's payload and any additional steps
   required to validate the particular type of signed object). Section 4
   describes in more detail the additional pieces that must be specified
   in order to define a new type of RPKI signed object that uses this
   template. Additionally, see [draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format] for an
   example of a document that uses this template to specify a particular
   type of signed object, the Route Origination Authorization.

1.1. Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

1.2. Note on Algorithms 

   Cryptographic Message Syntax is a general format capable of
 


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   accommodating a wide variety of signature and digest algorithms.  The
   algorithms used in the RPKI (and associated key sizes) are specified
   in [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].

2. Signed Object Syntax

   The RPKI signed object is a profile of the Cryptographic Message
   Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] signed-data object.  The general format of a
   CMS object is:

      ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        contentType ContentType,
        content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }

      ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The ContentType is the signed-data type of id-data, namely the id-
   signedData OID, 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2. [RFC5652]

2.1. Signed-Data Content Type

   According to the CMS standard, the signed-data content type is the
   ASN.1 type SignedData:

      SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
        version CMSVersion,
        digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
        encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
        certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
        crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
        signerInfos SignerInfos }

      DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier

      SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo

   Additionally, the SignerInfos set must contain only a single
   SignerInfo object.

2.1.1. version

   The version is the syntax version number.  It MUST be 3,
   corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version number 3.

2.1.2. digestAlgorithms

   The digestAlgorithms set contains the OIDs of the digest algorithm(s)
   used in signing the encapsulated content. This set MUST contain
 


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   exactly one digest algorithm OID, and the OID MUST be selected from
   those specified in [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].

2.1.3. encapContentInfo

   encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type
   identifier and the content itself.  The encapContentInfo represents
   the payload of the RPKI signed object.

        EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          eContentType ContentType,
          eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }

        ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

2.1.3.1. eContentType

   This field is left undefined by this profile.  The eContentType is an
   OID specifying the type of payload in this signed object and MUST be
   specified by the document that defines the object.

2.1.3.2. eContent

   This field is left partially undefined by this profile.  The eContent
   is the payload of the signed object and MUST be specified by the
   document that defines the RPKI object.

   At the outermost level, the eContent field MUST be an ASN.1 SEQUENCE.
   The first element of the sequence MUST be the version number, in
   order to enable transition to new versions of signed objects over
   time.

        ContentTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
          version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
          ... }

   The document that defines the specific RPKI object MUST specify the
   remaining fields, represented as ellipses (...).

2.1.4. certificates

   The certificates field MUST be included, and MUST contain exactly one
   certificate, RPKI EE certificate needed to validate this signed
   object.

2.1.5. crls

   The crls field MUST be omitted.
 


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2.1.6. signerInfos

   SignerInfo is defined under CMS as:

         SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           sid SignerIdentifier,
           digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
           signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signature SignatureValue,
           unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }

2.1.6.1. version

   The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice of
   SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid.

2.1.6.2. sid

   The sid is defined as:

         SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
           issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
           subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }

   For RPKI signed objects, the sid MUST be the SubjectKeyIdentifier
   that appears in the EE certificate carried in the CMS certificates
   field.

2.1.6.3. digestAlgorithm

   The digestAlgorithm MUST consist of the OID of a digest algorithm
   that conforms to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile
   specification [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].

2.1.6.4. signedAttrs

   The signedAttrs is defined as:

         SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

         Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
           attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
           attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }

         AttributeValue ::= ANY

 


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   The signedAttr element MUST be present and MUST include the content-
   type and message-digest attributes.  The signer MAY also include the
   signing-time signed attribute, the binary-signing-time signed
   attribute, or both signing-time attributes.  Other signed attributes
   MUST NOT be included.

   The signedAttr MUST include only a single instance of any particular
   attribute.  Additionally, even though the syntax allows for a SET OF
   AttributeValue, in an RPKI signed object the attrValues MUST consist
   of only a single AttributeValue.

2.1.6.4.1. Content-Type Attribute

   The ContentType attribute MUST be present.  The attrType OID for the
   ContentType attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3.

   The attrValues for the ContentType attribute MUST match the
   eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo.  Thus, attrValues must
   contain the OID that specifies the payload type of the specific RPKI
   signed object carried in the CMS signed data structure.

2.1.6.4.2. Message-Digest Attribute

   The MessageDigest Attribute MUST be present.  The attrType OID for
   the MessageDigest Attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4.

   The attrValues for the MessageDigest attribute contains the output of
   the digest algorithm applied to the content being signed, as
   specified in Section 11.1 of [RFC5652].

2.1.6.4.3. SigningTime Attribute

   The SigningTime Attribute MAY be present. Note that the presence or
   absence of the SigningTime attribute MUST NOT affect the validity of
   the signed object (as specified in Section 3). The attrType OID for
   the SigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5.

         id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
             us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 }

   The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is defined as:

         SigningTime ::= Time

         Time ::= CHOICE {
           utcTime UTCTime,
           generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }

 


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   The Time element specifies the time, based on the local system clock,
   at which the digital signature was applied to the content.

   The definition of Time matches the one specified in the 1997 version
   of X.509. Additional information regarding the use of UTCTime and
   GeneralizedTime can be found in [RFC5652].

2.1.6.4.4. BinarySigningTime Attribute

   The BinarySigningTime Attribute MAY be present. Note that the
   presence or absence of the BinarySigningTime attribute in no way
   affects the validity of the signed object (as specified in Section
   3). The attrType OID for the SigningTime attribute is
   1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46.

         id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
             member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
             smime(16) aa(2) 46 }

   The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is defined as:

         BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime

         BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

   The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based on the local system
   clock, at which the digital signature was applied to the content. The
   precise definition of the BinaryTime element can be found in
   [RFC4049].

2.1.6.5. signatureAlgorithm

   The signatureAlgorithm MUST conform to the RPKI Algorithms and Key
   Size Profile specification [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].

2.1.6.6. signature

   The signature value is defined as:

         SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

   The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and signature
   algorithms.

2.1.6.7. unsignedAttrs

   unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.

 


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3. Signed Object Validation

   Before a relying party can use a signed object, the relying party
   MUST validate the signed object by verifying that all of the
   following conditions hold.  A relying party may perform these checks
   in any order.  Note that these checks are necessary but not
   sufficient: in general, further validation MUST be performed based on
   the specific type of signed object.

   1.  The signed object syntax complies with this specification. In
       particular, that each of the following is true:

       a.  The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)

       b.  The version of the SignedData object is 3.

       c.  The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
           and contains one EE certificate, the Subject Key Identifier
           (SKI) field of which matches the sid field of the SignerInfo
           object.

       d.  The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.

       e.  The version of the SignerInfo is 3.

       f.  The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and
           contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.9.4).

       g.  The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is an OID
           that matches the attrValues in the ContentType attribute.

       h.  The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted.

       i.  The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData and SignerInfo objects
           conforms to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile
           specification [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].

       j.  The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object conforms to
           the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile specification
           [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs].

   2.  The public key of the EE certificate (contained within the CMS
       signed-data object) can be used to successfully verify the
       signature on the signed object.

 


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   3.  The EE certificate (contained within the CMS signed-data object)
       is a valid end-entity certificate in the resource PKI as
       specified by [I-D.sidr-res-certs].  In particular, there exists a
       valid certification path from a trust anchor to this EE
       certificate.

   If the above procedure indicates that the signed object is invalid,
   then the signed object MUST be discarded and treated as though no
   signed object were present.  If the all of the conditions above are
   true, then the signed object may be valid.  The relying party MUST
   then perform any additional validation steps required for the
   particular type of signed object.

4. Definition of Specific Signed Objects

   Each RPKI signed object MUST be defined based on this profile, by
   specifying the following data elements and validation procedure:

   1.  eContentType:  Obtain an OID to be used for the eContentType
       field in encapContentInfo.  This OID uniquely identifies the type
       of signed object.

   2.  eContent:  Define an ASN.1 syntax for the eContent field in
       encapContentInfo. The syntax must consist of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE
       whose first element is "version" expressed as an ASN.1 INTEGER.

   3.  Content-Type Attribute:  The mandatory Content-Type Attribute
       must have its attrValues field set to the same OID as
       eContentType in item 1.

   4.  Additional Validation:  Define a set of additional validation
       steps for the specific signed object. Before using this specific
       signed object, a relying party MUST perform both the generic
       validation steps in Section 3 above, as well as these additional
       steps.

5. Security Considerations

       There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in an RPKI
       signed object.  The integrity and authenticity of each signed
       object is based on the verification of a digital signature for
       the object, and on the validation of the EE certificate used to
       perform that verification.  It is anticipated that signed objects
       will be stored in repositories that will be publicly accessible.

6. IANA Considerations

       None.
 


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7. Acknowledgements

       The authors wish to thank Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, and
       Derek Kong for their help and contributions.  Additionally, the
       authors would like to thank Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny
       McPherson and Sam Weiler for their careful reviews and helpful
       comments.

8. Normative References

   [I-D.sidr-arch] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to
              Support Secure Internet Routing",
              draft-ietf-sidr-arch-09.txt (work in progress), October
              2009.

   [I-D.sidr-res-certs] Huston, G., Michaleson, G., and R. Loomans, "A
              Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",
              draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-18.txt (work in progress), May
              2010.

   [I-D.sidr-rpki-algs] Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key
              Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
              draft-huston-sidr-rpki-algs-00.txt (work in progress),
              July 2009.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
              5652, September 2009.

9. Informative References

   [RFC4049]  Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternate Format for
              Representing Date and Time in ASN.1", RFC 4049, April
              2005.

Authors' Addresses

   Matt Lepinski
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
 


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   Email: [email protected]

   Andrew Chi
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138

   Email: [email protected]

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138

   Email: [email protected]




































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