Geoff,
I don't recall if I sent this proposed, revised version to you, or
not. Anyway, here it is. I apologize that I "accepted" all of my
changes, so you'll need to do a diff to see the edits that I made.
My proposed changes reduce the number of discrete steps, both by
combining some steps, and by changing the order of some operations
Steve
Individual Submission G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: BCP APNIC
Expires: January 26, 2011 S. Kent
BBN
July 25, 2010
CA Key Rollover in the RPKI
draft-huston-sidr-aao-profile-0-keyroll-00.txt
Abstract
This document describes an algorithm to allow an entity who
undertakes the role of a Certification Authority in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure to perform a rollover of its key pair.
This document also notes the requirements placed on Relying Parties
who maintain a local cache of the objects that have been published in
the distributed Resource Public Key Infrastructure repository
publication structure.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 26, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology and Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. CA Key Rollover Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Relying Party Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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1. Introduction
This document describes an algorithm to be employed by a
Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastucture
(RPKI) [ID.ietf-sidr-arch] to perform a rollover of its key pair.
The document defines a conservative procedure for
such entities to follow when performing a key rollover so that
Relying Parties are in a position to be able to validate all
authentic objects in the RPKI using the validation procedure
described in [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] at all times.
1.1. Terminology and Concepts
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], the
profile for RPKI Certificates [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] and the
RPKI repository structure [ID.ietf-sidr-repository-structure].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. CA Key Rollover Procedure
A certification Authority (CA) in the RPKI is an entity that
issues certificates and CRLs, and RPKI signed objects. Over time,
there will be many instances of a CA. A CA instance is associated
with a single key pair [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs]) during normal
operation (not including the key rollover procedure described here or
cryptographic algorithm transition). The implication in the context
of key rollover is that, strictly speaking, a CA does not perform a
key rollover per se. In order to perform the equivalent of a key
rollover, the CA instantiates a new instance of itself, with a new
key pair, and then substitutes this new CA instance into the RPKI
hierarchy in place of the old CA instance.
There are several considerations regarding this procedure that MUST be
followed by a CA performing a key rollover operation. The
critical consideration is that the RPKI has potential application in
the area of control of routing integrity [ID.ietf-sidr-arch], and key
rollover should not cause any transient hiatus where a Relying Party
(RP) is led to incorrect conclusions regarding the authenticity of
attestations made in the context of the RPKI. A CA cannot not assume
that all Relying Parties will perform path discovery
in the same fashion, and therefore the key rollover procedure MUST
preserve the integrity of the CRLDP, SIA, and AIA pointers in RPKI
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certificates.
In the procedure described here, the CA creates a new CA instance,
and has the associated new public key published in the form of a new
CA certificate. While the current and new CA instances share a
single repository publication point, each CA instance has its own
CRL, and its own manifest. Initially, the new CA publishes an empty
CRL and a manifest that contains a single entry for the CRL.
The CA performing the rollover waits for a period of time to allow
every Relying Party to discover and retrieve this new CA certificate
and store
it in its local RPKI Repository cache. This period of time is
termed the "staging period". During this period, the CA will have a
new CA instance, with no subordinate products, and a current CA
instance which has issued all subordinate products. At the
expiration of the staging period the "new" CA instance MUST replace
all (valid) subordinate products of the previous CA instance,
overwriting the old subordinate products in the CA's repository
publication point. When this process is complete, the current CA instance
is retired, and the new CA instance becomes the current CA.
During the staging period the new CA instance re-issues all
subordinate products of the current CA. The procedure described here
requires that, with the exception of manifests and CRLs, the
re-issued subordinate products
be published using the same repository publication point object
names, effectively overwriting the old objects with these
re-issued objects. The intent of this overwriting operation is to
ensure that the AIA pointers of subordinate products at lower tiers
in the RPKI hierarchy remain correct, and that CA rollover does not
require any associated actions by any subordinate CA.
In describing the algorithm several reserved terms are used to
distinguish different instances of the CA that is rekeying. The term
CURRENT designates the instance of the CA that is active. An active
CA accepts and processes certificate issuance and certificate
revocation requests. The starting point for this algorithm is a
CURRENT CA the key of which is being rolled over. The CURRENT CA
instance is used by Relying Parties when verifying certificates and
signed objects, with one exception, as noted below.
The term NEW designates the CA instance that is being created. The
NEW CA is not active, and thus does not process certificate issuance
and revocation requests, until it becomes CURRENT. The NEW CA does
issue a CRL and an EE certificate in association with its manifest,
to provide a trivial, complete, consistent instance of a CA. (When a
CA certificate is encountered by an RP, the RP expects to find a
matching CRL, and that CRL MUST be enumerated on a manifest.) Thus,
the NEW CA has a brief, transient existence before it replaces the
CURRENT CA.
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When the CURRENT CA instance is replaced by the NEW CA instances, the
CURRENT CA is designated as the OLD CA instance. At this stage of
processing, the OLD CA and all of the products that it issued
(certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects) are removed from the
repository, and the algorithm is complete.
To perform a key rollover operation the entity MUST perform the
following steps in the order given here. Unless specified otherwise
each step SHOULD be performed without any intervening delay. The
process MUST be run to completion.
1. Generate a key pair for use by the NEW CA. Because the
goal of this algorithm is key rollover, the key pair generated in
this step MUST be different from the pair in use by the CURRENT CA.
2. Generate a certificate request with this key pair and pass
the request to the entity that issued the CURRENT CA certificate.
This request MUST include the same SIA extension that is present in
the CURRENT CA certificate. This request, when satisfied, will result
in the publication of the NEW CA certificate. This CA certificate
will contain an Subject Name selected by the issuer, which MUST be
distinct from the Subject Name used in the CURRENT CA certificate.
The CPS for the Issuer of the CURRENT and NEW CA certificates will
indicate the time frame within which a certificate request is
expected to be processed, and this time frame may vary among Issuers.
In many cases, the CA may be alerted to the issuance of the NEW CA
certificate only by observing the publication of the NEW CA
certificate in the repository. In such cases, the CA SHOULD monitor
the repository publication point of its Issuer, to determine when the
NEW CA certificate has been published. After it discovers that the
NEW CA certificate has been published, the CA MUST generate an empty
CRL, and a manifest that contains only this CRL, and publish these
items at the CA's publication point. The CA SHOULD generate and
publish these items as quickly as possible, to minimize confusion for
RPs that will encounter the NEW CA certificate. Because the NEW CA is
not active, it is RECOMMENDED that the CRL for the NEW CA have a
nextUpdate value will cause it to be replaced at the end of the
Staging Period (see steps 3 and 4 below).
3. After the NEW CA certificate and the corresponding CRL and
manifest have been published, the CA enters a Staging Period. This
duration of the Staging Period is determine by the CA, but it MUST be
no less than 24 hours. The Staging Period is intended to allow all
RPs to download the NEW CA certificate, prior to publication of
certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects under the NEW CA. During
the Staging Period, the CA SHOULD reissue (but not publish) all of
the products that were issued under the CURRENT CA. This includes all
CA certificates, and RPKI signed objects, and a manifest for these
products. Section 4 describes how each reissued product relates to
the product that it replaces. During the Staging Period, the CA
SHOULD continue to accept and process certificate issuance requests
and MUST continue to accept and process certificate revocation
requests. If any certificates are issued by the CURRENT CA during the
staging period, they MUST be re-issued under the NEW CA during the
period, and published at the end of the period. Any certificates that
are revoked under the CURRENT CA MUST NOT be re-issued under the NEW
CA. <do we want to say anything about interaction with the CPS here?>
4. Upon expiration of the Staging Period, the CA MUST
publish the signed products that have been re-issued under the NEW
CA, replacing the corresponding products issued under the CURRENT CA.
This replacement is implied by the file naming requirements imposed
by [ID.ietf-sidr-repository-structure] for these signed products. The
trivial manifest for the NEW CA (which contained only one entry, for
the NEW CA's CRL) is replaced by a manifest listing all of these
reissued, signed products. At this point the CURENT CA becomes the
OLD CA, and the NEW CA becomes the CURRENT CA. It is anticipated that
this step is very brief, perhaps a few minutes in duration, because
the CA has reissued all of the signed products during the Staging
Period. Nonetheless, it is desirable that the activities performed in
this step be viewed as atomic by relying parties. Thus (we need a
flag object here??)
5. The CA now generates a certificate revocation request for the OLD
CA certificate and submits it to the Issuer of that certificate. When
the OLD CA certificate is revoked, the CRL for the OLD CA is removed
from the repository, along with the manifest for the OLD CA. The
private key for the OLD CA is destroyed.
3. Relying Party Requirements
This procedure described above defines a "Staging Period" for CAs
performing a key rollover operation. This period is no shorter than
24 hours. Relying Parties who maintain a local cache of the
distributed RPKI repository MUST perform a local cache
synchronization operation against the distributed RPKI repository at
regular intervals of no longer than 24 hours.
4. Reissuing Certificates and RPKI Signed Objects
This section provides rules a CA MUST use when it reissues
certificates and RPKI signed objects as part of the key rollover
process. Note that CRLs and manifests are not reissued, per se. They
are generated for each CA instance. A manifest catalogs the contents
of a publication point relative to a CA instance. A CRL lists revoked
certificates, relative to a CA instance. Key rollover processing for
CRLs and manifests is described above, in Section 3.
4.1 CA Certificates
When a CA, as part of the key rollover process, reissues a CA
certificate, it copies all of the field and extension values from the
old certificate into the new certificate. The only exception to this
rule is that the notBefore value MAY be set to the current date and
time.
4.2 RPKI Signed Objects
An RPKI signed object is a CMS signed-data object, containing an EE
certificate and a payload (content). When a key rollover occurs, the
EE certificate for the RPKI signed object MUST be reissued, under the
key of the NEW CA. A CA may choose to treat this EE certificate the
same way that it deals with CA certificates, i.e., to copy over all
fields and extensions, and change only the notBefore date. If the CA
adopts this approach, then the new EE certificate is inserted into
the CMS wrapper, but the signed context remains the same. (If the
signing time or binary signing time values in the CMS wrapper are
non-null, they MAY be updated to reflect the current time.)
Alternatively, the CA MAY elect to generate a new key pair for this
EE certificate. If it does so, the object content MUST be resigned
under the private key corresponding to the EE certificate. In this
case the EE certificate MUST contain a new public key and a new
notBefore value, it May contain a new notAfter value, but all other
field and extension values remain constant. (If the signing time or
binary signing time values in the CMS wrapper are non-null, they MAY
be updated to reflect the current time.)
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5. Security Considerations
[To be added]
6. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this document.]
7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the review comments of Tim
Bruijnzeels in preparing this document.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[ID.ietf-sidr-repository-structure]
8.2. Informative References
[ID.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
progress), March 2009.
[ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
Huston, G., Michaleson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Internet
Draft draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-18.txt, February 2009.
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Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: [email protected]
URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson
Email: [email protected]
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
USA
Email: [email protected]
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