Hi Randy

I have a comment on section 5 of this draft based on our experience playing 
with this.

When you say:
 "  Announcements with invalid origins MAY be used, but SHOULD be less
   preferred than those with valid or unknown."
It would be worthy to write a note warning that invalid announcements which are 
more specific that an existing valid announcement SHOULD be discarded as they 
will always be preferred, independently of validation state of BGP attributes 
(longest prefix match).

Regards,

Roque

PS: we are working on code for this feature.



On Nov 8, 2010, at 6:57 AM, Randy Bush wrote:

> 
> From: IETF I-D Submission Tool <[email protected]>
> Date: November 8, 2010 6:55:37 AM GMT+01:00
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops-00 
> 
> 
> 
> A new version of I-D, draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops-00.txt has been successfully 
> submitted by Randy Bush and posted to the IETF repository.
> 
> Filename:      draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops
> Revision:      00
> Title:                 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operations
> Creation_date:         2010-11-08
> WG ID:                 Independent Submission
> Number_of_pages: 7
> 
> Abstract:
> Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many
> operational considerations.  This document attempts to collect and
> present them.  It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin
> validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood.
> 
> 
> 
> The IETF Secretariat.
> 
> 
> 
> A new version of I-D, draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops-00.txt has been successfully 
> submitted by Randy Bush and posted to the IETF repository.
> 
> Filename:      draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops
> Revision:      00
> Title:                 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operations
> Creation_date:         2010-11-08
> WG ID:                 Independent Submission
> Number_of_pages: 7
> 
> Abstract:
> Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many
> operational considerations.  This document attempts to collect and
> present them.  It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin
> validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood.
> 
> 
> 
> The IETF Secretariat.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> sidr mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr

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