Hi Geoff, > Section 5. Routing Policy > > Announcements with invalid origins MAY be used, but SHOULD be less > preferred than those with valid or unknown. > > > Here I agree with the sentiment in terms of the relativity to valid or > unknown, but I am worried about the MAY statement here, and I would like the > document to explain this further. > > For example, a simple reading of the document leads one to believe that all > announcements MAY still be accepted according to the routing policy selection > allowed in section 5, yet if that were the case then the ability of origin > validation to "deal with inadvertent mis-advertisement" is questionable. > > I would prefer the document to look at the implication of _why_ a party MAY > accept a route that the origination validation framework is leading to a > local judgement that the route is invalid. i.e. is it because of missing > information in the relying party's local cache, which may bne resolved over > time? Is is due to potential circularity of dependence, where parts of the > RPKI distributed repository lie behind routes that can only be judged as > valid using certs and ROAs found in that repository?
I am afraid that any attempt to enumerate the cases where an invalid route MAY be accepted will be incomplete! Rather, could we add a statement to the effect that accepting invalid routes is a pure local matter and should be done with utmost care? > > I would also like to see the security considerations section include a > statement to the effect that if a party were to use routes that have an > invalid validity state then the ability to detect and filter certain forms of > mis-advertisement would in effect be negated. Ack. > Back to the wordsmithing and consistency comment, the terminology of > unvalidatable origins and unknown origin is used in different sentences - it > would be better to use consistent terminology. Ack. > It would also be good if the terminology of validity state is consistent - > are we talking about "announcements" or "routes"? Are we talking about "valid > origin" or "routes that are validated by the RPKI ROA framework"? Ack. > > So close, but not quite ready for shipping yet in my opinion. > > (My apologies - I should've commented earlier on this, but its only a WGLC > that leads to these reviews happening for me.) No worries, thanks for these. Will be reflected in the next version. - Pradosh _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
