Hi Rob,

Just to clarify my position. 

I believe that the emergency roll-over is one use case where MUST would not 
apply. I checked some existing CPS to see what do they say about Emergency 
rekeying, the only mention that I could find was in the case or RIPE's CPS that 
mentions that an emergency re-keying of their off-line trust anchor was 
performed but not mention to the process utilized.

Referring to replace it with SHOULD or MAY, I believe that pre-publishing keys 
is a good practice. However, you have a point that if the staging period is 
made completely optional, you are not "breaking" RP softwares and consistency 
in the database across different RP is impossible to be enforced. One more 
issue to consider is that, if you look again to what the current CPSes are 
saying (i.e. LACNIC CPS section 4.7.6), you already have one business day delay 
since the moment that the re-keyed certificate was generated until the time 
that the re-keyed certificate shows up in the repository. If you do not have a 
staging period, you are facing the problem of starting resigning objects 
without your re-keyed certificate been published yet.

In your email email back in Dec, 7th you proposed: "Consider what would happen 
if, instead of following the process mandated by this document, a CA simply 
started issuing new certificates and reissuing old ones as fast as it 
reasonably could".

A compromise could be to make the staging period a MAY and add text that  
states what factors should be consider when defining "reasonably could". 

Cheers,
Roque.




On Feb 18, 2011, at 2:04 AM, Rob Austein wrote:

> At Tue, 8 Feb 2011 19:41:41 -0500, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> 
>> I concur with Geoff re the desirability of the staging period.  I 
>> disagree with Rob's suggestion that the staging period is at the 
>> wrong place in the document, or in the phased approach to key 
>> rollover.
>> 
>> From my perspective, the fundamental rationale for the staring period 
>> is two-fold:
>> 
>>      -  we want a delimited interval after which a CA can have 
>> reasonable confidence that all RPs will have retrieved the new CA 
>> key, before transiting to a new CA key and subordinate, signed 
>> products.
> 
> I have no problem with -allowing- a CA to wait for a staging interval
> here.  I do still object to -requiring- every CA to wait for a staging
> interval here.
> 
>>      - we also want a delimited interval for RPs so that they can 
>> acquire a new CA key prior to the transition to that key for 
>> subordinate signed products.
> 
> Not at all obvious.  So long as the new CA key is published before the
> subordinate signed product, either it just works or you're into the
> grey area of loose consistency, where there are so many ways to lose
> that it's almost not worth trying to enumerate them.  The net could
> partition.  One of the rsync servers could be down.  Your clock could
> be wrong.  Etc ad nausium.
> 
>> Because of the naming conventions adopted by the repository design, 
>> most of these new products overwrite old ones, so we want to maximize 
>> the likelihood that an RP gets a consistent set of data.
> 
> You appear to be assuming a model in which an RP discards old good
> data before fetching new bad data, thus potentially shooting itself in
> the foot whenever anything changes.  Perhaps instead one just ought
> not to write one's validator that way :)
> 
> Part of my issue (raised explicitly in an earlier message, not sure if
> you saw it) is that the justification for the staging period in the
> draft is very weak, and needs to be rewritten to fix this (if you can)
> before publication.  In essence, it starts with the bad assumption
> that perfect consistency is possible, even though we know (long
> mailing list discussion) that it is not, then justifies the staging
> period by saying that we must maintain consistency for the benefit of
> hypothetical validators that operate in strange ways that require it.
> Given that, as far as I know, none of the existing validators do
> require this of consistency (and given that, as noted, such
> consistency is not even possible), this does not make much sense.
> 
>> I agree with Rob that there is no delimited period that will 
>> guarantee that both CAs and RPs are in sync re a CA key transition. 
>> But, that does not mean that we ought not select and publish such a 
>> period, consistent with the other time intervals that we have 
>> published, e.g., the frequency at which RPs SHOULD query the 
>> repository.
> 
> If I believed in the need for the staging period, I would agree with
> this.
> 
>> As a compromise, we could re-phrase the staging period discussion to 
>> RECOMMEND a 24-hour minimum (vs. using MUST here), if the WG (not 
>> just you, Rob, :-)) feels strongly.
> 
> I would strongly prefer MAY to either MUST or SHOULD here.   That
> said, I would strongly prefer SHOULD to MUST. :)
> 
> Part of my issue, of course, is that I already have running code which
> does not follow the model you're trying to mandate here, and I am
> reluctant to change it to suit an ex post facto specification absent
> stronger justification than you've provided so far.  As far as I have
> been able to determine, what I have now works just fine, and the
> changes you're trying to mandate would require not just code changes
> but some additional complexity in the internal management operations.
> Right now I have two operations related to key rollover:
> 
> 1) Generate a new key, ask parent to issue new cert, deprecate (but
>   continue to maintain) old key and cert, and start issuing new
>   product with new key and cert until everything relevant has been
>   reissued.
> 
> 2) Revoke all deprecated keys and certs.
> 
> If I accept your changes, I not only need to add a third operation
> (start using the new key and cert), I also need to make names for the
> pesky things visible in the control protocol, expose those names in
> the user interface, etc, because somebody might restart the rollover
> operation during the staging period.  Whole collection of new ways for
> operator to get confused and shoot self in foot, to no gain that I can
> see, because you still haven't convinced me that the staging period is
> necessary in the first place.
> 
>> I also agree that, as Roque noted, in the case of an emergency rekey, 
>> the 24-hour staging period may be inappropriate. But an emergency 
>> rekey is not the same as a planned key rollover.  I suggest that we 
>> note this difference up front and say that, in case of an emergency, 
>> the CA re-issuing the cert which is being re-keyed SHOULD consider 
>> the impact on routing of a quicker transition to a new cert+key, and 
>> behave as it sees fit, given the circumstances surrounding the rekey.
> 
> So code has to be capable of carrying on without waiting for the
> staging interval.   Good.
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