> In my view of things, this is exactly the right way to do things. > Anything else is baling wire holding some pieces together, not a solution.
The problem lies right here: > In BGP, the semantics of the protocol are that the AS_PATH represents > the AS's through with the update has traveled. No, it doesn't, really. Not in all cases. > The point is to try to retain the semantics of the fields in the protocol. The point should be to find out what it is you're trying to secure, and then find a way to secure it. This _assumes_ the thing to secure is the current semantics of the protocol. But you're not addressing all the underlying assumptions that go with those semantics. > But maybe you get the idea. Suppose someone invented a way to prevent all of that without trying to verify what path an update followed? Let me ask you something --does IPsec try to verify the path the packet takes, or the contents of the packet? If the right solution for IPsec is to validate the content of the packet, then why is the right solution for BGP to verify the path of the packet? :-) Russ
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