On Mon, Apr 4, 2011 at 8:50 AM, Hannes Gredler <[email protected]> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 04, 2011 at 08:22:42AM -0400, Danny McPherson wrote: > | > | On Apr 4, 2011, at 4:32 AM, Hannes Gredler wrote: > | > | > > | > so my question is: "why do we need to solve the same problem > | > (= protecting message integrity) 2 times in different ways" ? > | > | This new machinery simply introduces object-level integrity functions > | in the application (i.e., BGP), it does nothing to ameliorate attacks > | at lower layers - all those substrate attack vectors (e.g., transport > | connection resets, injection or replay attacks) still exist and > | require controls as well -- else things might break in even uglier ways > | at higher layers. > > still that does not answer my question: why do we need to solve the problem > of transport integrity twice (or to play devils advocate: > shall we encapsulate BGP into SSH up until something better than MD5 > is available ;-))
some folks (not me) suggest that ipsec is the way to go here... (bgp I mean) I think one point to keep in mind is that tcp-ao has exactly zero implementations... while SSH implementations abound. -chris _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
