Hi, all,

I've reviewed the discussion about mandatory-to-implement connection security that dates back to Morrow's post of 1 Apr:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg02623.html

I'd like to note a few things:

1) ssh does not protect the transport connection
ssh is an application protocol, not a transport protocol

It provides privacy and authentication at the application layer, of the data over the TCP connection, but that connection can be interrupted by an attacker. This may not have the same impact as for vanilla BGP (where the connection disappearing causes routes to be removed), but should be a consideration in a "mandatory to implement" component, IMO.

2) TCP-AO was designed for BGP
TCP-AO was designed to get around concerns with the use of IPsec for BGP protection, and to correct for weaknesses in TCP MD5.

Any platform that is intended to use BGP in a protected way will need to implement TCP-AO anyway. Using that mechanism to protect other parts of BGP seems appropriate.

3) TCP-AO obsoletes TCP MD5
We did not deprecate TCP MD5 for legacy reasons only. It should not be recommended in any new cases.

4) a SIDR solution assuming TCP-AO isn't available on servers is an interim only

RFCs ought not focus on short term solutions, especially ones that are so easily corrected.

If the issue is the lack of a TCP-AO implementation in Linux and FreeBSD, it would be more productive to find the resources (6 man-months approx.) to just write this than even to discuss it on this list at length further.

If you do insist on including other alternatives, I would strongly suggest listing only IPsec; if you do include ssh (or, AFAICT, if you really want to get to servers, why not tls? surely servers are as likely if not more so to have HTTPS support) then you should note the lack of protection to the transport layer, and any implications that result.

Joe
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