Randy, Others,
It doesn't seem to be a new problem to me. How is this time problem
evaluated in the current off-line cache software?
Why think of another approach if the only difference is the device doing the
validation of certs and ROA's?
Regards,
Jac
On Tue, 26 Apr 2011, Randy Bush wrote:
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour.
does there need to be a 'why' for the 'approximately an hour'? (like:
"since granularity of cert time-to-live's is 30 mins on the minimum
side" ... wordsmith or whatever as appropriate)
because rpki processing cycles are likely to be of that tolerance. but
do we really want to go down this path?
If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriouly incorrect, it
'has reason to believe' ... seems hard to do
i suggested two well-know ways and got nit picked within 42 seconds. i
would be happy to put the examples, 1970 and 2005, back. but they are
just lint attractors.
Would it be appropriate to hack in a timehack to the rkpi-rtr
protocol? (featurecreeper!)
no. we will not reinvent time synchronization.
Servers SHOULD provide time service, such as NTP [RFC5905], to client
routers.
it seems that 'SHOULD' here may lead into forcing (or appearing to
force)
SHOULD != MUST
randy
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--
Jac Kloots
Network Services
SURFnet bv
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