I'm not sure if this is a nitpick or a legitimate concern, but:
"Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate more specifics to protect against mis-origination of a less specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix should protect it." I'm not sure I totally agree with this. Sure, with a relatively complete implementation among major networks, coupled with some sane policies in how those networks deal with invalid routes, that is basically true. However, in an incremental deployment model, it's a little overly optimistic. Perhaps some sort of caveat about incremental deployment and policy is appropriate here? Off of the top of my head- "As it is deployed in more and more networks, use of RPKI-based origin validation coupled with appropriate policies to handle invalid announcements will lessen (and hopefully eliminate?) the need to originate more specifics..." Thanks Wes George ________________________________ This E-mail and any of its attachments may contain Time Warner Cable proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to copyright belonging to Time Warner Cable. This E-mail is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this E-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or action taken in relation to the contents of and attachments to this E-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this E-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this E-mail and any printout.
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