Hi Chris,

Thank you for open this issue to the list.

From you email I did not get which is the security threat that you are trying 
to address. Is it just "fat fingers"? 

Also, I believe you may have a typo in your implementation comment as you 
cannot represent the RT in a certificate as it is not supported in the X.509 
specification (i.e. RFC3779) . So, I guess you were referring to modify the ROA 
signed object to include the RT information.  In this case, what if you just 
define a new signed object for VPN interconnections? We do not change anything 
of what has be done up to now and we do not need to wait for any roll-over. 
Then, each RP can store their locally define objects, use local policies (based 
on the ta-local draft) on its validators  and an extension to the rtr protocol 
to transmit the RTs-prefixes to the BGP speakers.

Finally, please note that the current agility draft only addresses the process 
for an algorithm suite change. Not for a change in the certificate profile or 
any change in basic RPKI certificates or signed objects. 

Roque.


On Jun 3, 2011, at 6:52 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:

> Peter asked at the mic about how SIDR/BGPSEC could/would/etc deal with
> VPN providers. I believe he meant something like MPLS VPN (RFC2547)
> providers. I think that after some discussion about this with a few of
> the document authors a summary of direction is:
> 
> A set of questions about the problem space (again, assuming 2547-type
> vpn deployment was the target of the question)
>  o  “what are you trying to secure?”
>      i  vpn-provider to vpn-provider routing domain?
>      ii  single-customer routing domain?
>  o  not all customer routes are picked up by BGP in VPN scenarios
>      i ospf/rip/eigrp/static routes
>      ii lack of origin by the AS-Owner (ROAs would be required to the
> VPN provider, not a problem)
>  o  not all customers have unique ip space across a single provider,
> never mind multiple providers
>  o  not all customers have unique ASNs across a single provider
>  o  route-targets are only unique across a single vpn-provider
> 
> 
> Of the above the only open question was as to what the scope of
> ‘secure’ would be, we decided (in the discussion) that the scope we
> would apply to the discussion is the:
>  vpn-provider to vpn-provider security
> 
> Given a scenario that looks like:
> vpn-provider BOB with vpns:
> A - route-target A - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
> B - route-target B - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
> C - route-target C - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
> 
> vpn-provider SALLY with vpns:
> Z - route-target Z - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
> Y - route-target Y - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
> X - route-target X - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
> 
> Each provider has their own Trust Anchor: TA-BOB and TA-SALLY
> these Trust Anchors contain (notionally) the following routing/roa 
> information:
> TA-BOB:
>     AS-A:RT-A:10.0.0.0/8
>     AS-B:RT-B:10.0.0.0/8
>     AS-C:RT-C:10.0.0.0/8
>     AS-D:RT-D:10.0.0.0/8
> 
> TA-SALLY:
>     AS-Z:RT-Z:10.0.0.0/8
>     AS-Y:RT-Y:10.0.0.0/8
>     AS-X:RT-X:10.0.0.0/8
>    AS-D:RT-V:10.0.0.0/8
> 
> 
> The two vpn-providers are connected together in order that their
> customers can have a vpn extending across both networks, for the case
> where a single provider (BOB) needs to extend their VPN service
> reach/territory into a region where they do not have (for reasons
> unimportant to the discussion) presence/facilities. If the intent is
> to secure vpn-provider to vpn-provider route exchange, some service
> must exist that translates:
> AS-D:RT-D:10.0.0.0/8 vs AS-D:RT-V:10.0.0.0/8
> 
> A proposed mapping service would accomplish this translation between
> the vpn-providers that participate in the single-customer,
> multi-provider network scenario. An open question, is whether this is
> necessary in a single provider deployment.
> 
> It seems that the mechanisms being proposed for BGPSEC can be extended
> to support the vpn-provider solution with the addition of a
> RouteTarget extension to the ROA End Entity Cert. This would require
> updating the certificate profile [draft-ietf-sidr-cp], and running the
> algorithm change process [draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility], in order
> to flood proper certificates out with the new extension. We could, of
> course, choose to change the cert profile today (except that it is in
> rfc editor queue at this time) and decide that RT=0 (for instance) is
> the “Internet”. It seems that the other mechanisms (mapping service)
> still need to be better defined, so revising the certificate profile
> later shouldn’t be a show stopper.
> 
> I hope the above helps some with Peter's question? Also, I'm really
> just the note taker on the above, the authors were more involved with
> the thought process (which makes sense to me, I do admit). Thanks for
> your indulgence!
> 
> -Chris
> _______________________________________________
> sidr mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr

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