Hi Chris, Thank you for open this issue to the list.
From you email I did not get which is the security threat that you are trying to address. Is it just "fat fingers"? Also, I believe you may have a typo in your implementation comment as you cannot represent the RT in a certificate as it is not supported in the X.509 specification (i.e. RFC3779) . So, I guess you were referring to modify the ROA signed object to include the RT information. In this case, what if you just define a new signed object for VPN interconnections? We do not change anything of what has be done up to now and we do not need to wait for any roll-over. Then, each RP can store their locally define objects, use local policies (based on the ta-local draft) on its validators and an extension to the rtr protocol to transmit the RTs-prefixes to the BGP speakers. Finally, please note that the current agility draft only addresses the process for an algorithm suite change. Not for a change in the certificate profile or any change in basic RPKI certificates or signed objects. Roque. On Jun 3, 2011, at 6:52 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > Peter asked at the mic about how SIDR/BGPSEC could/would/etc deal with > VPN providers. I believe he meant something like MPLS VPN (RFC2547) > providers. I think that after some discussion about this with a few of > the document authors a summary of direction is: > > A set of questions about the problem space (again, assuming 2547-type > vpn deployment was the target of the question) > o “what are you trying to secure?” > i vpn-provider to vpn-provider routing domain? > ii single-customer routing domain? > o not all customer routes are picked up by BGP in VPN scenarios > i ospf/rip/eigrp/static routes > ii lack of origin by the AS-Owner (ROAs would be required to the > VPN provider, not a problem) > o not all customers have unique ip space across a single provider, > never mind multiple providers > o not all customers have unique ASNs across a single provider > o route-targets are only unique across a single vpn-provider > > > Of the above the only open question was as to what the scope of > ‘secure’ would be, we decided (in the discussion) that the scope we > would apply to the discussion is the: > vpn-provider to vpn-provider security > > Given a scenario that looks like: > vpn-provider BOB with vpns: > A - route-target A - prefix 10.0.0.0/8 > B - route-target B - prefix 10.0.0.0/8 > C - route-target C - prefix 10.0.0.0/8 > > vpn-provider SALLY with vpns: > Z - route-target Z - prefix 10.0.0.0/8 > Y - route-target Y - prefix 10.0.0.0/8 > X - route-target X - prefix 10.0.0.0/8 > > Each provider has their own Trust Anchor: TA-BOB and TA-SALLY > these Trust Anchors contain (notionally) the following routing/roa > information: > TA-BOB: > AS-A:RT-A:10.0.0.0/8 > AS-B:RT-B:10.0.0.0/8 > AS-C:RT-C:10.0.0.0/8 > AS-D:RT-D:10.0.0.0/8 > > TA-SALLY: > AS-Z:RT-Z:10.0.0.0/8 > AS-Y:RT-Y:10.0.0.0/8 > AS-X:RT-X:10.0.0.0/8 > AS-D:RT-V:10.0.0.0/8 > > > The two vpn-providers are connected together in order that their > customers can have a vpn extending across both networks, for the case > where a single provider (BOB) needs to extend their VPN service > reach/territory into a region where they do not have (for reasons > unimportant to the discussion) presence/facilities. If the intent is > to secure vpn-provider to vpn-provider route exchange, some service > must exist that translates: > AS-D:RT-D:10.0.0.0/8 vs AS-D:RT-V:10.0.0.0/8 > > A proposed mapping service would accomplish this translation between > the vpn-providers that participate in the single-customer, > multi-provider network scenario. An open question, is whether this is > necessary in a single provider deployment. > > It seems that the mechanisms being proposed for BGPSEC can be extended > to support the vpn-provider solution with the addition of a > RouteTarget extension to the ROA End Entity Cert. This would require > updating the certificate profile [draft-ietf-sidr-cp], and running the > algorithm change process [draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility], in order > to flood proper certificates out with the new extension. We could, of > course, choose to change the cert profile today (except that it is in > rfc editor queue at this time) and decide that RT=0 (for instance) is > the “Internet”. It seems that the other mechanisms (mapping service) > still need to be better defined, so revising the certificate profile > later shouldn’t be a show stopper. > > I hope the above helps some with Peter's question? Also, I'm really > just the note taker on the above, the authors were more involved with > the thought process (which makes sense to me, I do admit). Thanks for > your indulgence! > > -Chris > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
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