On Thu, 9 Jun 2011 17:59:58 -0700 Terry Manderson <[email protected]> wrote:
> This document reflects the feedback from Prague both in the WG and > around the halls, being: Hi Terry, I know you sought some additional feedback via way of a shared colleague, I'm posting my thoughts here for the entire group to see and for posterity sake. Firstly, thanks for writing up a draft. Regardless of any draft's merit and eventual outcome, recording it and having the ensuing discussion into the annals of Internet history is rarely a bad idea. > 1) Use cases? who wants this. I'll assume that you're looking for more use cases beyond those you had envisioned when deciding to write it up. Otherwise, this is a solution looking for a problem. In the draft it is suggested there may be a use case for this information by Network Providers, Content Providers, Security Providers, Geo-Location (GEO) IP services and Research. I'll consider those cases below. There may be geopolitical reasons for this as well. DNS resolver operators may be interested in this like they are with the draft-vandergaast-edns-client-ip proposal. One of the main themes of my critique however will be that routing data does not reliably associate itself to geo-location. The title has: "first class geographical location statements" The abstract has: "first class informational statements pertaining to the geographical attributes" The introduction has: "first class informational attestations pertaining to the geographical attributes" Some consistency is needed, but perhaps I'm confused because I don't know what "first class" means in this context and I couldn't find it in the references. Instead of "validatable" I'd say "verifiable". In section 2, the specification suggests network providers can configure geoloc attributes for the benefit of content providers. This reasoning assumes cooperation between network and content providers. That may be assuming too much. It is not clear from the draft if the anycast operators will benefit from publishing geoloc information or if receiving it from other network operators is of value. Either could be potentially useful. As a general comment, IP addresses are inherently virtual and all attempts to tie them to a physical geographic location will be imperfect. All sorts of mobility, tunneling, subnetting and ephemeral address issues are not likely to go away. This leads me to believe that this work will be doomed from the start with some strict control on what goes into the system, something that the Internet community is not inherently good at mandating. In my opinion, having done some security work, it's not clear this would add much if any value for security providers unless it was widely implemented and implemented in a uniform manner. Neither seems likely unless it was followed up with some more stringent requirements from entities in charge of allocating the numbers. This geoloc information may also compete or duplicate that provided when the numbers are allocated and assigned. That may or may not be helpful. As has already been mentioned, this effort is not aligned to the goals of the charter for sidr. Adding more features to a system is tempting, but this is probably not the place or time for it. This is trying to address a current operational problem by bolting on a new feature to a new system in hopes of addressing current problems with future solutions. I empathize with the motivation and would be potentially interested in such a feature, but I recommend other tactics and venues for this sort of effort. John _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
