On Thu, 9 Jun 2011 17:59:58 -0700
Terry Manderson <[email protected]> wrote:

> This document reflects the feedback from Prague both in the WG and
> around the halls, being:

Hi Terry,

I know you sought some additional feedback via way of a shared
colleague, I'm posting my thoughts here for the entire group to see and
for posterity sake.

Firstly, thanks for writing up a draft.  Regardless of any draft's
merit and eventual outcome, recording it and having the ensuing
discussion into the annals of Internet history is rarely a bad idea.

> 1) Use cases? who wants this.

I'll assume that you're looking for more use cases beyond those you had
envisioned when deciding to write it up.  Otherwise, this is a solution
looking for a problem.

In the draft it is suggested there may be a use case for this
information by Network Providers, Content Providers, Security
Providers, Geo-Location (GEO) IP services and Research.  I'll consider
those cases below.    There may be geopolitical reasons for this as
well.  DNS resolver operators may be interested in this like they are
with the draft-vandergaast-edns-client-ip proposal.  One of the main
themes of my critique however will be that routing data does not
reliably associate itself to geo-location.

The title has:

  "first class geographical location statements"

The abstract has:

  "first class informational statements pertaining to the geographical
  attributes"

The introduction has:

  "first class informational attestations pertaining to the
  geographical attributes"

Some consistency is needed, but perhaps I'm confused because I don't
know what "first class" means in this context and I couldn't find it in
the references.

Instead of "validatable" I'd say "verifiable".

In section 2, the specification suggests network providers can
configure geoloc attributes for the benefit of content providers.
This reasoning assumes cooperation between network and content
providers.  That may be assuming too much.

It is not clear from the draft if the anycast operators will benefit
from publishing geoloc information or if receiving it from other network
operators is of value.  Either could be potentially useful.

As a general comment, IP addresses are inherently virtual and all
attempts to tie them to a physical geographic location will be
imperfect.  All sorts of mobility, tunneling, subnetting and ephemeral
address issues are not likely to go away.  This leads me to believe
that this work will be doomed from the start with some strict control
on what goes into the system, something that the Internet community is
not inherently good at mandating.

In my opinion, having done some security work, it's not clear this
would add much if any value for security providers unless it was widely
implemented and implemented in a uniform manner.  Neither seems likely
unless it was followed up with some more stringent requirements from
entities in charge of allocating the numbers.

This geoloc information may also compete or duplicate that provided when
the numbers are allocated and assigned.  That may or may not be helpful.

As has already been mentioned, this effort is not aligned to the
goals of the charter for sidr.  Adding more features to a system is
tempting, but this is probably not the place or time for it.  This is
trying to address a current operational problem by bolting on a new
feature to a new system in hopes of addressing current problems with
future solutions.  I empathize with the motivation and would be
potentially interested in such a feature, but I recommend other tactics
and venues for this sort of effort.

John
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