On 5/3/12 10:14 AM, Chris Morrow wrote:
On 05/03/2012 03:57 AM, t.petch wrote:
A question arising from my ignorance.
How do values in the security arc get assigned? Not IANA since there are no
IANA considerations, but how then?
good question... the below are asn.1 things, quickly searching around
isn't helping me out much either :(
Russ, any idea how this happens in practice? 'lick finger, test wind,
guess number' seems like the wrong method...
Russ Housley controls the pkix arc (has for years). If we need a value
from that arc (e.g., for the EKU extension and module OID), then
we'll/I'll send a request to Russ for an OID. He then returns an OID
after some review. I know he often compiles the modules too.
If you're curious about the OIDs under the 1.3.6.1.5.5.7 arc, the values
can be found at: http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/pkix-oid.asn.
The longer term plan is to transition the arc to IANA when PKIX closes.
spt
On the IANA profiles web page I can see
(1.3.6.1.5.5.4)
and
(1.3.6.1.5.5.8)
but no 1.3.6.1.5.5.7, just a reference to Russ.
Tom Petch
----- Original Message -----
From: "Christopher Morrow"<[email protected]>
To:<[email protected]>;<[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 10:16 PM
Helo WG peoples,
The following update posted today. Sean and Tom have come to agreement
on their differences, I believe this closes the last open items on
this document.
Let's start a WGLC for this, ending: 4/27/2012 or 27/4/2012
Thanks!
-Chris
<co-chair>
On Fri, Apr 13, 2012 at 3:03 PM,<[email protected]> wrote:
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing
Working Group of the IETF.
Title : A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation
Lists, and Certification Requests
Author(s) : Mark Reynolds
Sean Turner
Steve Kent
Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt
Pages : 11
Date : 2012-04-13
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper
operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under
development as a component to address the requirement to provide
security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a
protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the
private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on
behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of
certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path
validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore,
this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC
6487).
A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt
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