> Surely, what is described is technically possible, but it gives RPs no > clue if the procedures were followed. In fact, what a RP may see would > not be "congruent with the number resource allocation framework" [CP]. > > IMO a clean implementation would necessarily entail punching a hole in > C's certificate. But this is not what the draft recommends.
if A and C both ran CAs, and G has used C's CA to issue a cert and ROA for G's space, then (when C went unresponsive) A could either issue a ROA to G or a cert and a ROA. both work. seems to me to be more a matter of style than conformity. it is no more a matter of 'hole punching' than A issuing a ROA for various sub-pieces of its own space. what is interesting is the sharing of responsibility and control, not that it is a subset of the space. note that A might have owned a /16 which it then delegated a the whole /16 to C who redelegated the /16 to G. look ma, no holes! randy _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
