On Dec 18, 2012, at 6:24 PM, Sriram, Kotikalapudi wrote: > Since the intent is good, it is not an “attack” (at least as far as the > mitigator and the victim are concerned). > In BGPSEC (i.e. the path validation case), the proposed solution (below) is > clearly not even an apparent attack. > The victim (customer) is intentionally propagating a signed update to a > service provider (the mitigator). > The DDoS mitigation works (continues to work like it does today) without > having to create/propagate new RPKI objects.
So.... how, exactly, do we know it is not an attack? Is the ``intent bit'' set on all the updates? Eric _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
