>> It seems, to me, that if the RPKI can't be used to actually validate who >> owns what route with certainty, we're going to a lot of trouble for >> nothing... Or maybe folks are trying to have their cake and eat it to. >> "We'll provide solid security which you can ignore if you like, no >> problem." > > Routing policy has always been left to the local operator. You suggest a > change to a mandated global common policy. I don't think that could ever fly > with the operators.
Of course --but clearly there is a difference between "not present," and "under attack," something the current RPKI codes don't take into account. > So a flag day would be preferable, when everyone would be required to have > certified their address space? Since it's going to take 20 years to deploy anyway (according to various comments at the mic over the years, and on this and other lists)... Or perhaps we need a way of telling whether something should have an entry or not. :-) Russ _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
