Thanks Sharon for your email and analysis. These points are some of the points 
raised during our last meeting.

I personally believe that the non-TAL work requires more research activity and 
I guess from your email that you have an interest in this area :-).

Regards,
Roque

> Hi Roque,
> 
> As you work on this, I wanted share some observations made by my colleague 
> here at BU, Ethan Heilman. He read the draft in detail and had a two 
> suggestions and one question, see below.
> 
> Sharon
>  
> Suggestion 1:
>  
> Section 4.1 of the draft says: “If the connection to the preferred URI fails, 
> the RP SHOULD fetch the repository objects from the next URI of preference."
>  
> We suggest that the failover logic be extended to include validation failures 
> as well as connection failures (similar to the logic for TALs). That is, when 
> RPKI-validation generates a warning, an RP should fail over to another 
> publication point. These warnings could be generated by stale manifests, 
> manifest errors (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6486), expired certs, missing 
> ROAs, and other validation failures. We call this failover mode FO-Corrupt 
> (Failover On Corruption) as opposed to the current failover mode FO-Connect 
> (Failover On Connection failure) in the draft.  Here’s why we suggest 
> FO-Corrupt:
>  
> 1)      Multiple publication points using the FO-Connect policy increase the 
> attack surface, while multiple publication points using the FO-Corrupt policy 
> decrease the attack surface.  With FO-Connect, corruption failures in a given 
> publication point will directly affect RPs that select that publication 
> point.  Meanwhile, under FO-Corrupt, a corruption failure must occur on all 
> publication points before it affects RPs; each additional publication point 
> adds an additional barrier to an attacker that seeks to corrupt objects. This 
> also allows operators to raise the cost of an attack by adding publication 
> points using diverse software and operating systems.  Importantly, missing or 
> corrupted RPKI objects can cause routes to become classified as invalid, and 
> therefore be less preferred -- I provide examples of this happening in the 
> attached PDF – so if some of the publication points contain uncorrupted 
> objects, it’s important to ensure that RP’s fetch them.
>  
> 2)      The differences in behavior between TAL failover and RPKI object 
> failover could cause confusion.    FO-Corrupt would provide a more consistent 
> policy.   Compare the quote from Section 4.1 above with the following from 
> Section 3.2:          “If the connection to the preferred URI fails or the 
> fetched certificate public key does not match the TAL public key, the RP 
> SHOULD fetch the TA certificate from the next URI of preference.”
>  
> Suggestion 2:
>  
> Section 3.2 and 4.1 of the draft suggest three rules to select the URI of the 
> publication point:
> (1). Provided order, "the order provided in the correspondent certificate" 
> ---- my reading is that  this would be consistent across all RPs.
> (2). Random order (selecting randomly from the available list)
> (3). RP prioritized order, "a prioritized list of URIs based on RP specific 
> parameters such as connection establishment delay", this may or may not be 
> consistent across some subset of RPs. 
>  
> We see the value of giving RP’s the flexibility to choosing publications 
> points based on their own concerns (delay, jurisdiction, etc.).  But rule (3) 
> seems problematic because it could be exploited by attackers to predict the 
> order which an RP would fail over from one publication point to the next. For 
> example:
> i.                    An attacker could target the first publication point of 
> the list to distribute bad or missing objects, causing all RPs to get bad 
> information.
> ii.                  An attacker who happened to compromise a publication 
> point that was not the first element of the list, could e.g. DOS publication 
> points at the top of the list to ensure that RPs would use the attacker’s 
> publication point.  
> iii.                An attacker which could predict the fail over order could 
> perform a rolling DOS attack attacking the first element, then the second and 
> so on.
>  
> Question: 
>  
> Finally, there has been lots of work on fault-tolerant distributed database 
> systems that allow RPs to resolve inconsistencies between replicas of a 
> database.  We’re not experts on these systems, but given that RPs will 
> download RPKI data relatively infrequently, is this something that could be 
> considered here?
> <examples.pdf>

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