-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Stephen Kent wrote on 10/16/13 11:08 PM: >> It goes back to a recurring issue that has happened with the >> order of these documents, where we’re writing a threats doc and a >> requirements doc based on an existing design rather than the >> other around, and are tailoring these documents based on the >> current design to the exclusion of things deemed out of scope >> instead of documenting everything and then deciding some of the >> specific scope items in the requirements/design phase. > This seems to be the telling issue. You seem to be unhappy with > the scope of the WG charter, and refuse to accept it as bounding > for the work that is being performed. Your earlier comment refers > to the charter as "arbitrary" suggesting an unwillingness to accept > a charter as a a way to bound the scope of a WG.
I think formally you are absolutely right, Steve. The charter and the name of the document leave these issues outside the scope. But I see and agree with the points brought up by Wes. Since the ultimate goal of the SIDR effort is to secure interdomain routing, a threat analysis with a wider scope, not constrained by somewhat arbitrary limitation of the charter, could have been helpful. Not to call for a re-charter, but rather to put the proposed solutions in the overall security context. draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats could be that document. Andrei -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.14 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlJujjIACgkQljz5tZmtij9iDACgsbNtKG8BSh6SNCcXpztL6sap aFwAniQffoXzmadVE4NFGyY22/OJ76uE =kMEL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
