Comments below.
Am 15.01.2014 18:22, schrieb Sriram, Kotikalapudi:
From: sidr [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Demian Rosenkranz
Correct, Im talking about really short lifetimes for ROAs (EE certificates). The
RP software would be forced to cryptographically checks the objects again
and again over short intervals.
But long lifetimes for ROAs (EE certificates) mean at least bigger CRLs.
This would be one benefit of short lifetimes.
Even if about a few hundred origination-change events occur in a year that
require
ROA-EE-certificate rollover, you are dealing with an increase of merely just
that many
additional entries in the CRL (with the long-lifetime ROAs and revocation
approach).
If instead short lifetimes are used, then 500,000 certs and ROAs would be
propagated
in the RPKI system periodically in each of those short intervals.
The latter seems to be a much bigger price to pay.
OK, thats right!
But if you can provide further analysis and insight in your thesis,
it would be very welcome.
Unfortunately, I'm writing my thesis in German but I would be happy to
get feedback from the users of this mailing-list. So, I try to keep you
updated with the most significant results!
We discussed and quantified these types choices and trade-offs earlier
not in the context of ROA (EE cert) lifetimes, but in the context
of AS or router key rollover mechanisms to mitigate BGPSEC update replay
attacks.
Please see:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-02
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/slides/slides-85-sidr-4.pdf
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-02
Thank you for this information!
Sriram
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