Randyet al.,

In hopes of restarting work on this draft, here is proposed text for section 4. This is an attempt to integrate the original text with the comments to the list submitted back in Feb 2014. My apologies if I've mis-understood the original draft text or the comments. Does this correctly and clearly describe the use cases?

4.  Use Cases

Case 1:

   Organization C finds that its CA certificate has been revoked (or
   modified to remove resources) by the RIR (or ISP) that issued it.
   Or, if C has outsourced its CA operations, C finds that one of its
   children's certificates has been revoked (or modified to remove
   resources).C disagrees with this action and would like relying
   parties to be able to ignore, at their discretion, the certificate
   revocation (or modification). The revocation or modification could be:

         * unintentional, i.e., due to an error by RIR (or ISP) staff
         * malicious, i.e., done with the intent to cause problems,
           which could be aimed at C or some other entity.
         * mandated by a law enforcement agency in the jurisdiction
           where the RIR (or ISP) operates

   For example, Carol, a RIPE resource holder (LIR, PI holder, ...), is
   a victim of the "Dutch Court Attack." Someone has convinced a Dutch
   court to forcethe RIPE/NCC to remove or modify some or all of
   Carol's certificates, ROAs, etc. or the resources they represent.
   However, the operational community wants to retain the ability to
   route to Carol's network(s).

Case 2:

   Organization B makes use of private address space (RFC 1918) or
   address space allocated to another party but not globally announced
   by that party or by B. B wants its routers to be able to use RPKI
   data for both internal routing to these addresses and for global
   routing.


Case 3:

   Organization A is authorized to control the routing of traffic from
   a set of organizations (within A's administrative control) to the
   rest of the Internet. A wants traffic from these organizations that
   is destined for a set of prefixes outside of A's administrative
   control to be routed to other addresses, or to be dropped. A
   accomplishes this by controlling the UPDATEs sent to those
   organizations. Because these organizations use the RPKI, A needs a
   way to coordinate their use of the RPKI in support of A’s traffic
   management goals.

   For example, Alice runs the network operations for a large
   consortium X. Her management requests that traffic (from X's
   members) that is destined for a competitor's site, be re-directed to
   a site approved by X. To do this,Alice has to ensure that the RPKI
   has the appropriate certificates, ROAs, etc. for those approved
   addresses as well as for the rest of the Internet.

Thank you,
Karen




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