Dear working group, I support adopting this work. I believe it's useful to think about what can go wrong. I am happy to see that this document (1) focusses on adverse actions irrespective of intentional or accidental cause, and (2) does not suggest a solution.
I do have one remaining concern, but I hope that this can be addressed: this document can be perceived as proof of 'all the things wrong / scary' about RPKI used for origin validation and/or BGPSec. However, to my knowledge, there is no similar analysis of adverse actions to IRRs. Most of the same problems exist there - and far worse: RPs do not have the benefit of object security so they would be largely unaware. I think it would be counterproductive if this wasn't clear, and the document is abused to make a point for being better of with simple IRR. Regards Tim > On 11 Mar 2016, at 18:05, Sandra Murphy <[email protected]> wrote: > > This starts an adoption call for draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions-02. > > Please respond on the list if you believe the working group should adopt this > draft as a work item. The adoption call will end 25 Mar 2016. > > Remember that positive support is needed for adoption. Please state whether > you believe the work should be adopted and whether you will review and > comment on the work. > > The draft is available at > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions-02 > > —Sandy, speaking as one of the wg co-chairs > > > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
