Oleg,

Thanks for the feedback on our doc.
Well, actually there is normative language:
you're right. those instances of MUST will be changed to lowercase, since the intent is that this doc be informational.
And there are several other places where the normative language is not used, 
but implied.
the doc is re-iterating what requirements doc say, so it is appropriate to use language that conveys what the requirements are, but we do try to avoid normative language. We'll revise the doc to remove normative (uppercase) language, but we will continue to convey what is mandated vs. optional, etc.
This doc outlines the RP functions, summarizes them and then gives reference to 
those precise sections or paragraphs, in order to make life easier for 
implementers to make sure he/she has addressed all of these requirements.
I have two comments for this paragraph.

First, it might seem appealing to create a document that will give a "reference to 
those precise sections or paragraphs", so that the implementer could skip reading 
those long RFCs in full.  But I do not think it is possible or advisable. Even in your 
draft you say:

    An RP is required
    to verify that a resource certificate adheres to the profile
    established by [RFC6487].  This means that all extensions mandated by
    [RFC6487] must be present and value of each extension must be within
    the range specified by this RFC.  Moreover, any extension excluded by
    [RFC6487] must be omitted.

or

    To determine whether a manifest is valid, the RP is required to
    perform manifest-specific checks in addition to those specified in
    [RFC6488].

So very often it is more practical to refer to the whole RFCs, because an 
implementer has to implement all of it, not just specific paragraphs.
I agree that implementers will have to read the cited RFCs. The goal here is to provide an overview of the requirements and to enumerate the RFCs that contain such requirements.
Second, what if, for whatever reason, this document will not list *all* of the 
requirements?  Will it be OK for the implementer to say "I did everything specified 
there", or will (s)he be required to double-check with other RFCs you refer to?  Or 
even with those you do not refer to?

I'm not sure how to define the applicability of such document.
the utility of the doc is that it provides a concise, high level description of RP requirements, and pointers to the normative RFCs where these requirements are fully specified. The BGPsec overview I-D is informational and provides a concise description of what a router needs to do to implement BGPsec, but it points to the relevant RFCs that provide the full specs for BGPsec, router certs, etc.
Any comments and feedbacks are appreciated.
Here are my comments for some specific sections:

    3.1.  Verifying Resource Certificate and Syntax

    Certificates in the RPKI are called resource certificates, and they
    are required to conform to the profile [RFC6487].  An RP is required
    to verify that a resource certificate adheres to the profile
    established by [RFC6487].  This means that all extensions mandated by
    [RFC6487] must be present and value of each extension must be within
    the range specified by this RFC.  Moreover, any extension excluded by
    [RFC6487] must be omitted.

I think you should not repeat the text of other RFCs, otherwise you risk of 
being incomplete or going out of sync with referenced RFC.
An informational RFC providing an overview always runs this risk, but that doesn't make it a bad idea.

    3.2.  Certificate Path Validation

    In the RPKI, issuer can only assign and/or allocate public INRs
    belong to it, ...

I don't think assignment or allocation of INR happens in RPKI.
good point. the text will be revised to note that the RPKI _represents_ the allocations of INRs.

    3.3.  CRL Processing

    The CRL processing requirements imposed on CAs and RP are described
    in [RFC6487].  CRLs in the RPKI are tightly constrained; only the
    AuthorityKeyIndetifier and CRLNumber extensions are allowed, and they
    MUST be present.  No other CRL extensions are allowed, and no
    CRLEntry extensions are permitted.  RPs are required to verify that
    these constraints have been met.  Each CRL in the RPI MUST be
    verified using the public key from the certificate of the CA that
    issued the CRL.


Apart from using normative language mentioned above, you seem to repeat the 
text of other RFC.
Is it the only bit of RFC6487 that is applicable to CRL processing in RPKI 
validation?
Aren't any CRL validation (not only in RPKI) requires that CRL must be verified 
using the public key of it's issuer?
The cited text notes what CRL processing requirements are unique to the RPKI. ALL PKIs require that a CRL be validated using the public key of the issuer of the CRL.

    4.2.1.  Manifest

    To determine whether a manifest is valid, the RP is required to
    perform manifest-specific checks in addition to those specified in
    [RFC6488].

    Specific checks for a Manifest are described in section 4 of
    [RFC6486].  If any of these checks fails, indicating that the
    manifest is invalid, then the manifest will be discarded and treated
    as though no manifest were present.

This description is quite incomplete. Perhaps you should merge the content of section 
"4.3.  How to Make Use of Manifest Data" in here, but even there I do not see a 
reference to section 6 (Relying Party Use of Manifests) of RFC6486, which is quite a big 
omission.
I agree that this needs more work. Your doc describing what the RIPE RP code does include examples where you have made choices that are allowed, but not mandated, by RFCs. This text wants to say what is mandated and what is allowed. I suspect we may add an implementation guidance section that will address issues where implementers have options and what experience has taught us about the pros and cons of different options.

    4.2.2.  ROA

    To validate a ROA, the RP is required perform all the checks
    specified in [RFC6488] as well as the additional ROA-specific
    validation steps.  The IP address delegation extension [RFC3779]
    present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the
    ROA), must encompass each of the IP address prefix(es) in the ROA.
    More details for ROA validation are specified in section 2 of
    [RFC6482].

The second sentence is almost a 1-to-1 copy of Section 4 of 6482. What's the 
point of copying it instead of referencing?
the goal of this doc is both to point to all of the RFCs that establish RP requirements, and to provide an overview of the requirements. In some cases, the text here will paraphrase the requirements, in other cases it may merely restate them.

Section 2 of RFC6482 defines the ROA content-type, not the validation.
god catch, we'll fix that.


    4.2.3.  Ghostbusters

    The Ghostbusters Record is optional; a publication point in the RPKI
    can have zero or more associated Ghostbuster Records.

This is true for all objects except manifest and CRL.
yes, so what?
    If a CA has at
    least one Ghostbuster Record, RP is required to verify that this
    Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax of signed object defined
    in [RFC6488].

And this is also true for any signed object.
ibid.
    The payload of this signed object is a (severely) profiled vCard.  An
    RP is required to verify that the payload of Ghostbusters conforms to
    format as profiled in [RFC6493].

I'm mentioning it here, but it applies to many places in this document: the 
validation section of RFC6493 already references RFC6488. So why duplicate it 
here?

Oleg, I think we fundamentally disagree about the utility of a doc like this. I agree that this initial cut can be improved, but I disagree with you sentiment that it is not a worthwhile document. I have provided you and Tim with extensive comments on your RIPE validation description doc, and these have identified a number of places where the text needed to be clarified or fixed, i.e., it was technically incorrect. In that light I think it would be fair to assume that successive versions of this doc can improve as well, and thus refusing to consider it is premature.

Steve
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