Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-20: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks for addressing my discuss points. OLD COMMENTS below, I didn't edit 'em... - section 2: I think this is a bit badly written: "The use of BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Router Certificate is used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers process these)." Do you mean that there's no way that an entity can confuse a Manifest, ROA, CSR or BGPsec update so there's no issue with which public keys are used to verify the signatures on those data structures? - section 3: As noted in my comments on the BGPsec protocol, it'd be better to call out the SKI here if you don't add the direct ref to 6487 to the BGPsec protocol draft. _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
