Hiya, On 05/01/17 14:10, Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) wrote: > Stephen, > > Thank you for the detailed review and comments. > Please see my responses marked with [Sriram] inline below. > > [Sriram] Your DISCUSS points (1) and (3) were already > discussed /being discussed in separate threads.
Yep, thanks. I need to check back to see how close we are to resolving those, but I had thought the ball wasn't in my court at the moment:-) I'm sure we'll sort 'em soon though. > >> (2) Figure 8: It seems to me to be an error to omit the > signer's ASN from the signed data and only have that > included in the signer's certificate. Why is that intimate > level of binding to the RPKI desirable? There may well be > reasons but I'm not seeing 'em, and I am recalling that it > took a chunk of effort to make CMS less dependent on > X.509 for similar reasons (meaning identifying signers > exclusively via cert issuer and serial in that case). I > would expect that there could be demand to have some level > of independence between BGPsec and RPKI for at least > internal uses such as those noted in the spec already. > > [Sriram] Signer's ASN is indeed included in the signed data. > In Figure 8, "Secure_Path Segment : N" corresponds > to the signing AS (current AS) and that is where the > signer's ASN is included along with its pCount and Flags. Hmm. That's the target ASN of the previous signer though. I thought there were cases where they could differ? But if not, then you probably need to state that as a rule for checking signatures, is that there already? (Happy to check later, but don't have time right now.) One other thing below... > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> COMMENT: >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> - Figures 2 and 5 present the fields in different orders. > That seems like a bad idea. > > [Sriram] Good catch. Already fixed in my editor copy of version-22. > >> - 3.2: The reference to the pki profile doc is not precise > enough, the string "key identifier" does not occur in that > draft - it's in RFC6487, 4.8.2. > > [Sriram] Again, a good catch. Already fixed in my editor copy of version-22. > >> - 4.1, last para: is the distinction between an "internal > peer" and "iBGP peer" sufficiently clear to routing folk? > For me they sound similar but I assume it's ok. > > [Sriram] I think it is well understood. But when I push version-22 out, > I’ll consider if I should simply just use "iBGP peer" consistently > and avoid using "internal peer". > >> - 5.2, I think you need to say something to the effect > that every Secure_Path MUST have a signature with an > algorithm that is supported. As I read the text, the > algorithm as stated here could be read to not require > that. E.g. the para before the bullets on p25 could be > read to mean "drop all stuff involving unsupported algs > and then continue to process the rest of the stuff." > > [Sriram] Seems like a bit of a pathological case. > Could happen only if the sender behavior was incorrect. Yes, but 5.2 is verifier behaviour and out not assume a correct signer, so I do thing the alg presented here needs to cover such things. > Sender is not required to know which algorithms a peer supports > but sender's expected behavior is this: MUST include a Signature_Block > for the "current" algorithm (which every BGPsec speaker > MUST support through the transition period), Where does it say that the current/next thing applies to the entire world of BGPsec? I didn't read it that way as it happens, but rather that the current/next could involve different algorithms at different nodes at the same time. So e.g. I read it to be allowed that a migration from rsa/sha256 then to ecdsa then to eddsa could occur with some non-updated nodes still signing with rsa/sha256 whilst some shiny new nodes are doing ecdsa and eddsa and others are in between. I do agree that a global current/next pair of algs is nicer, if that is what's wanted. But I don't recall the text saying that. (Again happy to check later, but no time right now;-) Cheers, S. > and if the sender supports the "next" algorithm, > then it MUST include a Signature_Block for the "next" algorithm also. > So the peer BGPsec receiver (who MUST support > at least the "current" algorithm) is not expected to be starved > of a Signature_Block it can work with. > >> - section 7: WRT non-deterministic signature algorithms, I > think it'd be useful to note here that all such algorithms > require good random number generation on the signer's > system and that failing in that respect can expose the > signer's private key. IMO deterministic signature schemes > are better for this reason but the need for a good RNG is > I think a real operational issue worthy of note. > > [Sriram] I will include wording to cover this in Section 7 in version-22. > > Sriram >
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