Hi Rob, On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 8:01 PM, Rob Austein <[email protected]> wrote: > At Wed, 18 Jan 2017 10:17:00 -0800, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > ... >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> COMMENT: >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> As for Alissa's comment on transport, more language added to the Security >> Considerations section would be helpful to explain why the CMS signature >> is sufficient. I am assuming that the only exposure would be to public >> information during transport that is protected from tampering, unless I >> missed something in reading the draft (I don't think you are transferring >> private keys and didn't see that in the text). > > Correct, no private keys in flight here. Everything being transferred > is a signed object intended for public consumption.
OK, my response here was tied to my text following that considered CA policies. Having run CAs and reviewed many policies, most are strict enough that I would think the session encryption would be mandated by policy assurance level. This would mean something like only those operating under a rudimentary assurance level might not have session encryption... but knowing where that line is drawn would be helpful. I believe Stephen put a discuss on this and I agree with that since I was making assumptions on the policy assurance requirements. If the assurance requirements cover the need for session encryption, that should be stated or a stronger requirement in this draft per Stephen's discuss. Thank you, Kathleen > > Will try to come up with something for security considerations (I > would say "suggestions welcome" but I think you just did...). -- Best regards, Kathleen _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
