-original message- Subject: Re: [silk] On the rights of (harmless) bigots From: Bonobashi <[email protected]> Date: 23/05/2009 3:49 pm
--- On Sat, 23/5/09, Kiran K Karthikeyan <[email protected]> wrote: > > Kiran > > -original message- > Subject: [silk] On the rights of (harmless) bigots > From: Pranesh Prakash <[email protected]> > Date: 23/05/2009 4:06 am > > Flogging dead horses, I know, but this article caught my > eye, and > reminded me (quite illogically, I must admit) of the overly > long > thread "Need some help". > > But, it makes many interesting points, whether you agree > with the author or not. > > --- > From the Balkinization blawg: > <http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/support-your-local-bigot.html> > > Support your local bigot > Andrew Koppelman > I have written several times that there should be > accommodation for > religious conservatives who have conscientious objections > to > recognizing same-sex marriages. Religious exemptions from > antidiscrimination laws are fairly costless, I’ve argued: > as long as > the religious dissenters are idiosyncratic outliers – and > they > generally will be, based on the scant number of > accommodation claims > we’ve seen – they’ll have no effect on gay people’s > opportunities, and > so they can harmlessly be left to live out their ideals in > peace. > > This has elicited the following objection from several > friends: why do > you want to accommodate bigots? The issue is now being > squarely > presented in New Hampshire, where opponents of religious > accommodation > are now ready to let same-sex marriage die in that state > rather than, > as one supporter has put it, “enshrine homophobia into > the statutes of > the New Hampshire Legislature.” > > What is bigotry, anyway, and why is it a bad thing? The > answer to this > question will provide an answer to my skeptical friends, > and also show > why the legislators resisting religious accommodations in > New > Hampshire are sadly mistaken in their priorities. > > Bigotry is wrong for two reasons. First, it harms the > people who are > its objects. Second, it is a moral failing on the part of > the bigot. > It is important to distinguish these. > > The most obvious harm of bigotry is that people are hurt by > it. Racism > hurts racial minorities; sexism hurts women; homophobia > hurts gay > people. This harm occurs even if the people who are doing > the > discriminating are innocently deluded about what they are > up to. > “Honest to God when I was a kid, I believed that junk,” > a white > southerner, Hugh Wilson, explains in Jason Sokol’s recent > book There > Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil > Rights, > 1945-1975. “I was just like everybody else. Too many of > us thought > that, we knew individual blacks to be awful fine folks but > we thought > of blacks as a race as being sort of an Amos and Andy > situation . . . > . I began to get a lot older before I began to realize.” > Perhaps, in > his situation, Wilson can be excused for his ignorance. But > excusable > or not, his attitudes were profoundly destructive. Calling > young > Wilson a bigot is not to say that he’s a bad person who > should be > punished. It’s saying that he’s a deluded person who > needs to be > stopped from damaging others. > > A second wrong of bigotry is the wrong of unjust > perception. This is > wrong even if it causes no harm at all. In a revealing > little parable > in her 1971 book, The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch > elegantly > refutes a then-fashionable school of moral philosophy that > concerned > itself only with the appropriateness of conduct, and which > was > entirely indifferent to people’s internal mental states. > > A woman, M, feels hostile toward her daughter-in-law, D. M > thinks that > her son has married beneath him, and finds D unrefined, > brusque, and > rude. However, M always behaves beautifully toward D, and > keeps her > real opinion well concealed. And then suppose that the > young couple > emigrates, or D dies, so that whatever happens after that > happens only > in M’s mind. M now reflects on D, moved only by love for > her son and a > desire to be just. She concludes that D has many good > qualities that M > had failed to appreciate: she is not undignified but > spontaneous, not > vulgar but refreshingly simple, and so on. In the course of > these > reflections, Murdoch insists, M has been “active, she has > been doing > something, something which we approve of, something which > is somehow > worth doing in itself.” > > The relevance here of Murdoch’s point can be made > clearer, perhaps, by > considering the odd case of Japanese anti-Semitism, which > our host > Jack Balkin describes in his book Cultural Software. > “[A]nti-Semitic > books and comments have appeared continually in Japan over > the years, > often repeating the most vicious claims of Nazi ideology > and Eastern > European anti-Semitism. Especially popular are beliefs > about a secret > worldwide Jewish financial and media conspiracy of enormous > scope and > power.” This nonsense functions for the Japanese as a way > of > accounting for and complaining about the power of the > United States, > which is taken to be controlled by the Jews. It does not, > however, > have much impact on anyone: “There are very few Jews in > Japan today > and thus very few opportunities for discrimination against > them.” > Bigotry is bigotry in Germany or in Japan, but it doesn’t > matter for > the same reasons in both places. In Japan, the complaint is > entirely > Murdochian: it is wrong to judge people unjustly. But why > should the > law care about this kind of harmless injustice? > > There is, of course, a moral category of reprehensible > ignorance, > recognized as far back as Aquinas, who thought that error > was culpable > if it were either directly voluntary (because the agent > deliberately > avoided uncomfortable information) or if the agent were > negligent > about knowing what he ought to know. And one can be > reprehensible in > this way both for one’s private thoughts, in the > Murdochian sense, and > for one’s actions that ignorantly damage other people. I > have no doubt > that there are some homophobes who are culpable in just > this way. I > also think that there are others who are in the grip of a > world view > according to which homosexuality just can’t imaginably be > morally > acceptable, and who aren’t penetrable by any data to the > contrary. I’m > less inclined to blame them, particularly since, as the > struggles of > those within the “ex-gay movement” shows, there are > some gay people > among them. > > Finally to return to the question of religious exemptions! > The > objection to religious exemptions can’t be that they’ll > harm gay > people, because they will only be invoked by a few people > and won’t > have much effect on gay people’s opportunities. It is > rather that we > shouldn’t accommodate bigotry. Now, I disagree with the > views of > religious conservatives who think homosexual conduct to be > morally > wrong. I think that these views are mistaken in just the > way that M’s > views had been in the early part of Murdoch’s story. I > even think that > some of those who hold those views are morally culpable. > But does this > mean that the law ought to be used to punish them? > > Retribution is appropriate only if there is harm. Imagine > you discover > that someone has spent all afternoon sticking pins in > dolls > representing some people he doesn’t like (but has no just > complaint > against), hoping that this will cause their painful deaths. > You’re > entitled to decide that he’s a nasty person. But does he > deserve > punishment? For what, exactly? > > If they can be rendered harmless, antigay bigots, even the > morally > reprehensible ones, will be just like the guy with the pins > and the > dolls. Nasty, maybe (though I know people on that side of > the > political divide who, I’m convinced, are honestly doing > their best to > pursue the right as it is given to them to see the right). > But why is > it important for the law to beat up on them? > > More pertinently, why is beating up on them so important > that it’s > worth letting same-sex marriage die in New Hampshire > altogether rather > than give those people any accommodation? > > There are people who are reprehensibly embracing > self-aggrandizing > fantasies that are hurting real people. But I’m sorry to > say that > they’re not the Christian conservatives. They are the > people on my > side, the gay rights side, who are willing to sacrifice the > hopes of > New Hampshire gays who want to marry, out of pure malice > toward their > political opponents. > > From: Kiran K Karthikeyan <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [silk] On the rights of (harmless) bigots > To: [email protected] > Date: Saturday, 23 May, 2009, 12:02 PM > Since you're flogging it anyway > - who exactly are you alluding to be the harmless > bigot in that thread? I'm sure its not me since I'm anything > but harmless :). Harmless indeed, also gormless. I don't know if you know me that well but if you're so sure, I'll agree. I'm anything but gormless as well. :). Nobody will hurt you - promise - if you render that 'I'm sure it's not I...' rather than the way you did serve it up. Ummm...ok. So now you're going to hurt me or what? Kiran
