Um. Interesting take. Comments?

Udhay

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/the_death_of_macho

The Death of Macho


Manly men have been running the world forever. But the Great
Recession is changing all that, and it will alter the course of history.

      BY REIHAN SALAM | JUNE 22, 2009

The era of male dominance is coming to an end.

Seriously.

For years, the world has been witnessing a quiet but monumental shift of
power from men to women. Today, the Great Recession has turned what was
an evolutionary shift into a revolutionary one. The consequence will be
not only a mortal blow to the macho men’s club called finance capitalism
that got the world into the current economic catastrophe; it will be a
collective crisis for millions and millions of working men around the
globe.

The death throes of macho are easy to find if you know where to look.
Consider, to start, the almost unbelievably disproportionate impact that
the current crisis is having on men—so much so that the recession is now
known to some economists and the more plugged-in corners of the
blogosphere as the “he-cession.” More than 80 percent of job losses in
the United States since November have fallen on men, according to the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. And the numbers are broadly similar in
Europe, adding up to about 7 million more out-of-work men than before
the recession just in the United States and Europe as economic sectors
traditionally dominated by men (construction and heavy manufacturing)
decline further and faster than those traditionally dominated by women
(public-sector employment, healthcare, and education). All told, by the
end of 2009, the global recession is expected to put as many as 28
million men out of work worldwide.

Things will only get worse for men as the recession adds to the pain
globalization was already causing. Between 28 and 42 million more jobs
in the United States are at risk for outsourcing, Princeton economist
Alan Blinder estimates. Worse still, men are falling even further behind
in acquiring the educational credentials necessary for success in the
knowledge-based economies that will rule the post-recession world. Soon,
there will be three female college graduates for every two males in the
United States, and a similarly uneven outlook in the rest of the
developed world.

Of course, macho is a state of mind, not just a question of employment
status. And as men get hit harder in the he-cession, they’re even less
well-equipped to deal with the profound and long-term psychic costs of
job loss. According to the /American Journal of Public Health/, “the
financial strain of unemployment” has significantly more consequences on
the mental health of men than on that of women. In other words, be
prepared for a lot of unhappy guys out there—with all the negative
consequences that implies.

As the crisis unfolds, it will increasingly play out in the realm of
power politics. Consider the electoral responses to this global
catastrophe that are starting to take shape. When Iceland’s economy
imploded, the country’s voters did what no country has done before: Not
only did they throw out the all-male elite who oversaw the making of the
crisis, they named the world’s first openly lesbian leader as their
prime minister. It was, said Halla Tomasdottir, the female head of one
of Iceland’s few remaining solvent banks, a perfectly reasonable
response to the “penis competition” of male-dominated investment
banking. “Ninety-nine percent went to the same school, they drive the
same cars, they wear the same suits and they have the same attitudes.
They got us into this situation—and they had a lot of fun doing it,”
Tomasdottir complained to /Der Spiegel/. Soon after, tiny, debt-ridden
Lithuania took a similar course, electing its first woman president: an
experienced economist with a black belt in karate named Dalia
Grybauskaite. On the day she won, Vilnius’s leading newspaper bannered
this headline: “Lithuania has decided: The country is to be saved by a
woman.”

Although not all countries will respond by throwing the male bums out,
the backlash is real—and it is global. The great shift of power from
males to females is likely to be dramatically accelerated by the
economic crisis, as more people realize that the aggressive,
risk-seeking behavior that has enabled men to entrench their power—the
cult of macho—has now proven destructive and unsustainable in a
globalized world.

Indeed, it’s now fair to say that the most enduring legacy of the Great
Recession will not be the death of Wall Street. It will not be the death
of finance. And it will not be the death of capitalism. These ideas and
institutions will live on. What will not survive is macho. And the
choice men will have to make, whether to accept or fight this new fact
of history, will have seismic effects for all of humanity—women as well
as men.



For several years now it has been an established fact that, as
behavioral finance economists Brad Barber and Terrance Odean memorably
demonstrated in 2001, of all the factors that might correlate with
overconfident investment in financial markets—age, marital status, and
the like—the most obvious culprit was having a Y chromosome. And now it
turns out that not only did the macho men of the heavily male-dominated
global finance sector create the conditions for global economic
collapse, but they were aided and abetted by their mostly male
counterparts in government whose policies, whether consciously or not,
acted to artificially prop up macho.

One such example is the housing bubble, which has now exploded most
violently in the West. That bubble actually represented an economic
policy that disguised the declining prospects of blue-collar men. In the
United States, the booming construction sector generated relatively
high-paying jobs for the relatively less-skilled men who made up 97.5
percent of its workforce—$814 a week on average. By contrast,
female-dominated jobs in healthcare support pay $510 a week, while
retail jobs pay about $690 weekly. The housing bubble created nearly 3
million more jobs in residential construction than would have existed
otherwise, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Other,
mostly male-dominated, industries, such as real estate, cement
production, truck transport, and architecture, saw big employment gains
as well. These handsome construction wages allowed men to maintain an
economic edge over women. When policymakers are asked why they didn’t
act to stem the housing bubble’s inflation, they invariably cite the
fact that the housing sector was a powerful driver of employment.
Indeed, subsidizing macho had all kinds of benefits, and to puncture the
housing bubble would have been political suicide.

And yet, the housing bubble is just the latest in a long string of
efforts to prop up macho, the most powerful of which was the New Deal,
as historian Gwendolyn Mink has argued. At the height of the Great
Depression in 1933, 15 million Americans were unemployed out of a
workforce that was roughly 75 percent male. This undermined the male
breadwinner model of the family, and there was tremendous pressure to
bring it back. The New Deal did just that by focusing on job creation
for men. Insulating women from the market by keeping them in the home
became a mark of status for men—a goal most fully realized in the
postwar nuclear family (Rosie the Riveter was a blip). In this way,
according to historian Stephanie Coontz, the Great Depression and the
New Deal reinforced traditional gender roles: Women were promised
economic security in exchange for the state’s entrenchment of male
economic power.

Today, this old bargain has come undone, and no state intervention will
restore it. Indeed, the U.S. economic stimulus package no longer bears
much resemblance to a New Deal-style public-works program. Despite early
talk that the stimulus would stress shovel-ready infrastructure
projects, high-speed rail lines, and other efforts that would bolster
heavily male sectors of the economy, far more of the money is
going—directly or indirectly—to education, healthcare, and other social
services. Already in the United States, women make up nearly half of
biological and medical scientists and nearly three quarters of
health-industry workers. No less an authority than U.S. President Barack
Obama has weighed in on the shift of power from men to women, telling
the /New York Times/ that, though construction and manufacturing jobs
won’t vanish altogether, “they will constitute a smaller percentage of
the overall economy.” As a result, he said, “Women are just as likely to
be the primary bread earner, if not more likely, than men are today.”

What this all means is that the problem of macho run amok and
excessively compensated is now giving way to macho unemployed and
undirected—a different but possibly just as destructive phenomenon. Long
periods of unemployment are a strong predictor of heavy drinking,
especially for men ages 27 to 35, a study in /Social Science & Medicine/
found last year. And the macho losers of globalization can forget about
marrying: “Among the workers who disproportionately see their jobs
moving overseas or disappearing into computer chips,” says sociologist
Andrew Cherlin, “we’ll see fewer young adults who think they can marry.”
So the disciplining effects of marriage for young men will continue to
fade.

Surly, lonely, and hard-drinking men, who feel as though they have been
rendered historically obsolete, and who long for lost identities of
macho, are already common in ravaged post-industrial landscapes across
the world, from America’s Rust Belt to the post-Soviet wreckage of
Vladimir Putin’s Russia to the megalopolises of the Middle East. If this
recession has any staying power, and most believe it does, the massive
psychic trauma will spread like an inkblot.

How will this shift to the post-macho world unfold? That depends on the
choices men make, and they only have two.

The first is adaptation: men embracing women as equal partners and
assimilating to the new cultural sensibilities, institutions, and
egalitarian arrangements that entails. That’s not to say that all the
men in the West will turn into metrosexuals while football ratings and
beer sales plummet. But amid the death of macho, a new model of manhood
may be emerging, especially among some educated men living in the
affluent West.

Economist Betsey Stevenson has described the decline of an older kind of
marriage, in which men specialized in market labor while women cared for
children, in favor of “consumption” marriage, “where both people are
equally contributing to production in the marketplace, but they are
matching more on shared desires on how to consume and how to live their
lives.” These marriages tend to last longer, and they tend to involve a
more even split when it comes to household duties.

Not coincidentally, the greater adaptability of educated men in family
life extends to economic life, too. Economist Eric D. Gould found in
2004 that marriage tends to make men (particularly lower-wage earners)
more serious about their careers—more likely to study more, work more,
and desire white-collar rather than blue-collar jobs. This adaptation of
men may be the optimistic scenario, but it’s not entirely far-fetched.

Then, however, there’s the other choice: resistance. Men may decide to
fight the death of macho, sacrificing their own prospects in an effort
to disrupt and delay a powerful historical trend. There are plenty of
precedents for this. Indeed, men who have no constructive ways of
venting their anger may become a source of nasty extremism; think of the
kgb nostalgists in Russia or the jihadi recruits in search of lost
honor, to name just a couple. And there are still plenty of men in the
West who want to “stand athwart history, yelling Stop.” These guys
notwithstanding, however, Western developed countries are not for the
most part trying to preserve the old gender imbalances of the macho
order this time around.

Instead, the choice between adaptation and resistance may play out along
a geopolitical divide: While North American and Western European men
broadly—if not always happily—adapt to the new egalitarian order, their
counterparts in the emerging giants of East and South Asia, not to
mention in Russia, all places where women often still face brutal
domestic oppression, may be headed for even more exaggerated gender
inequality. In those societies, state power will be used not to advance
the interests of women, but to keep macho on life support.

Look at Russia, where just such an effort has been unfolding for the
past decade. Although there are 10.4 million more Russian women than
men, this hasn’t translated into political or economic power. After the
Soviet collapse, the ideal of women’s equality was abandoned almost
entirely, and many Russians revived the cult of the full-time homemaker
(with Putin’s government even offering bonus payments for childbearing
women). But Russian men, floored by the dislocations of the Soviet
collapse and a decade of economic crisis, simply couldn’t adapt. “It was
common for men to fall into depression and spend their days drinking and
lying on the couch smoking,” Moscow writer Masha Lipman observes.
Between their tremendously high rates of mortality, incarceration, and
alcoholism and their low rates of education, only a small handful of
Russian men were remotely able (or willing) to serve as sole breadwinners.

This left Russia’s resilient women to do the work, while being forced to
accept skyrocketing levels of sexual exploitation at work and massive
hypocrisy at home. A higher percentage of working-age women are employed
in Russia than nearly any other country, Elena Mezentseva of the Moscow
Center for Gender Studies has found, but as of 2000, they were making
only half the wages that Russian men earned for the same work. All the
while, Putin has aided and abetted these men, turning their nostalgia
for the lost macho of Soviet times into an entire ideology.

If this represents a nightmare scenario for how the death of macho could
play out, another kind of threatening situation is unfolding in China.
The country’s $596 billion economic stimulus package bears a far
stronger resemblance to a New Deal-style public-works program than
anything the U.S. Democratic Party has devised. Whereas healthcare and
education have attracted the bulk of U.S. stimulus dollars, more than 90
percent of the Chinese stimulus is going to construction: of low-income
homes, highways, railroads, dams, sewage-treatment plants, electricity
grids, airports, and much else.

This frenzy of spending is designed to contain the catastrophic damage
caused by the loss of manufacturing jobs in China’s export sector. The
Chinese Communist Party has long seen the country’s 230 million migrant
workers, roughly two thirds of whom are men, as a potential source of
political unrest. Tens of millions have lost manufacturing jobs already,
and so far they’ve proved unwilling or unable to return to their native
provinces.

Just as the housing bubble in the United States was a pro-male policy,
China’s economic trajectory over the past two decades is deeply tied to
its effort to manage the threat posed by the country’s massive male
migrant population. Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist
Yasheng Huang has argued that while the first decade after Deng
Xiaoping’s economic reforms saw tremendous economic growth and
entrepreneurship in the Chinese hinterlands, the next two decades have
seen a marked decline in the economic prospects of rural China coupled
with a concerted effort to promote the rapid development of China’s
coastal cities. State-owned enterprises and multinational corporations
enjoyed generous subsidies, tax abatements, and other insider deals, and
in return, they employed millions of migrants. The trade-off exacerbated
China’s internal migration, as millions of men fled rural poverty in
search of short-term urban employment, but after the Tiananmen Square
uprising, Chinese elites welcomed it as a way to stave off urban unrest.

Today, however, it’s hard to see how Chinese leaders can safely unravel
this bargain. Matters are made worse by China’s skewed population—there
are 119 male births for every 100 female—and the country has already
seen violent protests from its increasingly alienated young men. Of
course, it’s possible that China will constructively channel this
surplus of macho energy in the direction of entrepreneurship, making the
country a global source of radical innovation, with all the military
implications that entails. More likely, if the nature of China’s
stimulus is any indication, Beijing will continue trying to prop up its
urban industrial economy—for if this outlet for macho crumbles, there is
good reason to believe that the Communist Party will crumble with it.

It might be tempting to think that the death of macho is just a cyclical
correction and that the alpha males of the financial world will all be
back to work soon. Tempting, but wrong. The “penis competition” made
possible by limitless leverage, arcane financial instruments, and pure
unadulterated capitalism will now be domesticated in lasting ways.

The he-cession is creating points of agreement among people not
typically thought of as kindred spirits, from behavioral economists to
feminist historians. But while many blame men for the current economic
mess, much of the talk thus far has focused on the recession’s effects
on women. And they are real. Women had a higher global unemployment rate
before the current recession, and they still do. This leads many to
agree with a U.N. report from earlier this year: “The economic and
financial crisis puts a disproportionate burden on women, who are often
concentrated in vulnerable employment É and tend to have lower
unemployment and social security benefits, and have unequal access to
and control over economic and financial resources.”

This is a valid concern, and not incompatible with the fact that
billions of men worldwide, not just a few discredited bankers, will
increasingly lose out in the new world taking shape from the current
economic wreckage. As women start to gain more of the social, economic,
and political power they have long been denied, it will be nothing less
than a full-scale revolution the likes of which human civilization has
never experienced.

This is not to say that women and men will fight each other across armed
barricades. The conflict will take a subtler form, and the main
battlefield will be hearts and minds. But make no mistake: The axis of
global conflict in this century will not be warring ideologies, or
competing geopolitics, or clashing civilizations. It won’t be race or
ethnicity. It will be gender. We have no precedent for a world after the
death of macho. But we can expect the transition to be wrenching,
uneven, and possibly very violent.

ILLUSTRATION BY AARON GOODMAN FOR FP
BARBARA LUTTERBECK/GETTY IMAGES



/Reihan Salam is a fellow at the New America Foundation./


-- 
((Udhay Shankar N)) ((udhay @ pobox.com)) ((www.digeratus.com))

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