[www.ANTIC.org] Just bluffing?

[Miroslav Antic]

Title: Message

Just bluffing?   Mary Dejevsky of The Independent in Britain offers the contrarian view that the US actually wants to avoid war in Iraq, and is instead practising classic gunboat diplomacy to force the Hussein regime to disarm voluntarily. She says the US mobilization in the Gulf and search for a UN resolution authorizing war do not necessarily point to the inevitability of war; they may equally be designed to present the credible threat of war, without which the Iraqis would have no incentive to disarm. Similarly, the detailed war plans being leaked by the Pentagon are designed to impress the Iraqis that resistance would be futile. At the same time, Dejevsky notes US and British officials are vague about an invasion timetable. The threat of force can often be as effective as its exercise, but, in the case of Iraq, the massive build-up appears to go well beyond the requirements of gunboat diplomacy. The Bush administration seems so confident of swift victory and so eager to demonstrate American power, it is hard to imagine it foregoing the temptation to invade. An accompanying article in The Hindu – reporting on Russian pressure to force a peaceful regime change in Iraq – is one way US objectives could be satisfied short of war, and Dejevsky’s maverick thesis realized. -Supporting facts

Could all this talk of war actually be nothing more than a giant bluff?   By Mary Dejevsky The Independent February 26 2003  The Prime Minister's latest effort to justify a war against Iraq was as eloquent as it was brave. It was almost as ambiguous, too, with its rejection of timetables, endorsement of the UN and its familiar recitation of Saddam's crimes. For months, Tony Blair and select ministers have tried everything – from passion through moral indignation to spurious historical parallels, not to speak of a graduate thesis snatched from the internet – to compensate for the lack of real, recent evidence. Their signal achievement has been the biggest-ever street protest in peacetime. We are just not convinced. Perhaps, though, convincing us is not what our Government is about. Perhaps, just perhaps, what we are watching is a quite different exercise: an elaborate bluff that is actually designed to avoid war rather than provoke it. Let me lay my cards on the table. For the past eight months or so I have been an almost-lone office dissident. While sharing the widespread view that a war on Iraq is highly undesirable – and, without a UN mandate, wrong – I do not believe that anyone, not Mr Blair, and perhaps not even the apparently trigger-happy US administration, intends a war to happen. And the louder the war cries from Washington and London, the more firmly I am convinced. It takes a strong, not to say foolhardy, nerve to maintain this rejectionist front. The fancier flights of Bush-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz warmongery out of Washington reinforce the impression that the US administration is dead set on war. British ministers chorus their support. And the evidence, less of Saddam Hussein's crimes than of US and British war plans, piles up inexorably: all those troops, weapons and journalists arriving daily in the Gulf. Piling on the pressure, though, is precisely what the US and Britain are doing. In this scenario, every piece of information that finds its way into the public domain is geared to one end – convincing the enemy that unless he complies with whatever is demanded, he will face massive military force. Of course, elaborate preparations must be made for war, but they are not for the purpose of fighting a war, but for the purpose of creating – in words so familiar from many a British minister's statement – the credible threat of war. The regular leaking to the media of detailed war plans fosters the impression of painstaking preparation and imminent action. Last year, the appearance of rival blueprints in the US press was evidence of splits in the military; they were a form of lobbying direct from individuals and departments in the Pentagon. The new battle plans appearing in the press are hypothetical in a different way. They are designed to show Saddam that a military operation is not only feasible, but will be 100 per cent effective in destroying his regime, unless he complies with the UN. The objective is to convince not us, but Iraq. In the event, the political risks in this virtual war are turning out to be almost as high as those of real combat. The European Union is split over what France and Germany see as an unseemly rush to war. The dispute about missiles for Turkey may have sounded the death-knell for Nato. Tony Blair is in a particular bind. If he believes that the best chance of averting a war is to convince Saddam that the threat of war is real, he must put the case for war as passionately and cogently as he can. The result, however, is that Mr Blair finds himself cast simultaneously as a war-monger and a Bush "poodle". His position at the head of his party could be at risk and – as the huge demonstration in London showed – the credibility of his government has been harmed. Senior ministers find themselves similarly trapped. Jack Straw seems to feel the contradiction more keenly than most. Last week, after delivering an especially fierce threat of war, he paused before answering yet another hostile question to say: "Hey, I'm against a war, too." A few weeks before, he had been publicly carpeted by Downing Street for suggesting that the odds on a war had declined. His crime, I suspect, was not to be wrong, but to have been right, thus undermining the impression that war was inevitable. Similarly, the criticism of Geoff Hoon's half-term holiday: his offence was not to have gone away, but to have cracked the fa�ade of a Cabinet on a full war footing. The need continually to increase the pressure on Baghdad also helps to explain the confusion in ministers' messages. Are the US and Britain planning a war because Saddam Hussein has breached UN resolutions, or because he invaded two neighbours in the past, or because he used chemical weapons against Kurds, or because he presides over a regime that uses torture and scorns human rights, or because he may be concealing weapons that we know he has? None of these reasons, not even Iraq's failure to comply with past UN resolutions, really carries conviction; Iraq is simply not seen by the public as an immediate threat to world peace. If the message is addressed to Saddam Hussein, however, then the grimmer the picture that is painted the better. The point is not to convince Western opinion that war is justified, but to convince Baghdad that action is likely. In that case, uncertainty is an asset. The confusion sown in British and European minds about UN mandates, timetables and whether Mr Bush will go it alone can all be seen as designed to keep the enemy guessing. So far it seems that US and British war propaganda has scared Western – especially European – public opinion more than it has scared Saddam. There may eventually come a time, therefore, when the US and Britain have to face the very thing they were contriving to avoid – fighting a war – or back down. Then again, they may not. All the war rhetoric from London and Washington has obscured the real concessions already made by Iraq. The weapons inspectors are back; they have freedom of movement, including access to the presidential palaces. Iraqi scientists are being interviewed (even if they are understandably reluctant to leave their home country for that purpose). U2 and other spy planes have the freedom of the sky over Iraq. The no-fly zones are still being enforced, and Iraq's Kurds have de facto autonomy. More progress is needed. Baghdad must now decide what to do about missiles that only just exceed what is allowed by the UN. It must explain what happened to poison gas and other banned materials it obtained before the Gulf War. But much has been conceded. What we are looking at is a remarkably successful application of 21st century gunboat diplomacy. There is no reason whatever to risk failure now by actually going to war. Russian plan for Saddam exit   By Atul Aneja The Hindu February 27 2003  In holding discussions with the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, over the weekend, the former Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, may have proposed a realistic formulation that could help in averting a U.S.-led attack on Baghdad. Mr. Primakov reportedly held extensive discussions with Mr. Hussein on Saturday and Sunday in one of the palaces of the Iraqi President in Tikrit, north of the Baghdad. For Mr. Primakov, his talks were in some ways a replay of 1991 when he had been asked to undertake a trouble-shooting mission by Moscow, to ward off the first Persian-Gulf war. The former Russian Premier, who was also the one-time chief of the KGB, is a West Asia expert and is known to be Mr. Hussein's personal friend. There is considerable speculation in diplomatic circles in the region about the specific proposals that Mr. Primakov brought before Mr. Hussein on behalf of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. But according to one view, Mr. Primakov addressed the question of Iraqi disarmament and explored the possibility of ensuring Mr. Hussein's honourable departure from the Iraqi centre-stage. Mr. Pirmakov, in his effort to address the question of Iraqi disarmament and "regime change", started with the assumption that Mr. Hussein would not accept voluntary exile as an option to defuse the crisis. Consequently, diplomatic sources point out that it is likely that Mr. Primakov exhorted Mr. Hussein to fully cooperate with the U.N. weapons inspectors so that Iraqi disarmament could be concluded soon. Incidentally, the U.N. chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix on Tuesday described as "positive" Iraq's recovery of a R-400 bomb and the receipt of letters, which could explain the whereabouts of some earlier stocks of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons. The Russian Foreign Ministry in a statement has also said after Mr. Primakov's departure from Baghdad that there was "a real chance to put a full stop to the question of Iraq's potential to develop weapons of mass destruction.'' Without seeking his voluntary exile, it is likely that Mr. Primakov proposed to Mr. Hussein that he could continue as Iraq's figurehead President for another year. But during this time-frame, he should consider appointing a new interim authority where all Iraqis, including some of those who were at present in exile, were represented. This body, in turn, needed to draft a new democratic constitution and hold fresh elections. Mr. Hussein, after the lapse of a year, could retire by choosing to reside in one his palaces under an international guard. While his movements thereafter would become circumscribed, Mr. Hussein's financial assets, under this arrangement would continue to remain protected. Russia is expected to launch a diplomatic offensive to "sell" these ideas, especially to Germany, France and the United States, in case Mr. Hussein finds the broad thrust of these proposals acceptable.

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