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Russia Shifting Allegiance Toward European
Union?
STRATFOR ^
| Mar 08, 2003 | Staff
Summary
Russia's tough stance against a U.S.-sponsored
Security Council resolution authorizing military action against Iraq reflects a
mini-crisis that has erupted within the Kremlin over broader U.S.-Russian
relations. Continued U.S. demands on Russia, with little offered in return, have
empowered a faction in the Kremlin that supports building closer relations with
the West through the European Union, rather than through Washington. Though
Russia is trying to avoid burning bridges with the United States, its decision
to side with France and Germany on the issue of war inevitably will damage
U.S.-Russian relations. The question is: Following a U.S. war with Iraq, will
France and Germany remain true to their new Russian ally, or abandon it as they
seek to mend their own relations with
Washington?
Analysis
Russia has hardened its stance on
the U.S. policy toward Iraq in recent days, with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
saying Moscow would rather veto the U.S.-sponsored war resolution than abstain,
and joining his French and German colleagues in vowing to block the resolution.
Stratfor sources in Moscow report that the tough new stance reflects a
mini-crisis in U.S.-Russian relations, which had dramatically improved under
Russian President Putin and after the Sept. 11 attacks. The issues dividing the
two countries run deeper than war in Iraq, and could shape U.S.-Russian
relations for some time to come.
The first point of contention regards
Washington's stated intent to move U.S. forces from Germany to Poland, Bulgaria
and probably Romania. If this happens, as seems likely, it would be the third
time Washington has broken its promises not to advance the U.S.-led NATO, and
U.S./NATO forces, toward Russian borders.
First, President Ronald Reagan
promised Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev that in exchange for Russia's
voluntary exit from Germany, no NATO forces would move into East Germany even
after the inclusion of a reunified Germany in NATO. Second, Reagan, and
subsequently former U.S. presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton promised first
Gorbachev and later Russian President Boris Yeltsin that post-communist
countries would not become a part of NATO. In both cases, Washington went back
on its vow.
In this case, Clinton and U.S. President George W. Bush
promised Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin, that no foreign forces would
be stationed inside the borders of the new and prospective NATO members. With
Washington planning to deploy its forces in Eastern European countries, Moscow
sees the third promise broken as well.
Putin, who has directed Russian
policy toward becoming a junior partner to the United States, has conducted a
consistently pro-U.S. policy over the last two years and, despite anti-war
rhetoric, had hinted to Washington that Russia ultimately would not veto the
U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq. But according to Stratfor's sources,
Putin has said that Washington's open discussion of putting U.S. troops in East
European countries without even informing Moscow has gone too far.
The
second point of contention has been simmering for some time. The Russian
government reportedly is getting tired of making endless unilateral concessions
to Washington while not receiving anything essential in return. In Putin's mind,
the only real gesture Washington has made toward Russia has been in slightly
reducing its criticism of the Chechen war, but even that has not been
comprehensive. Sources say that that today's ratification of the START II
strategic arms control treaty by the U.S. Senate is an all too obvious attempt
to influence Russia's position in the U.N. debate on Iraq. Moreover, it doesn't
matter much, as Russia has been scrapping its arms in accord with this treaty
for years, and the treaty itself favors the United States over Russia by
increasing the U.S. advantage in strategic nuclear arms.
A third factor
emerges from the eternal backroom Kremlin power struggle -- where the faction
arguing Russia's links to the West should be through the European Union rather
than the United States -- appears to be gaining the upper hand. This faction
consists of many of Putin's inner circle, including Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov, Foreign Intelligence Service Director Sergei Lebedev, and many others in
Russia's national security and foreign affairs establishment, such as Deputy
Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky and Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov.
The pro-EU faction helped persuade Putin to send close ally
Yevgeny Primakov, still very influential in Russia and the Middle East, to
Baghdad at the end of February. Putin then sent Alexander Voloshin, his chief of
staff and a leader of the pro-U.S. camp in the Kremlin, to relay to Washington
what Primakov had discussed with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The Russian
proposal consisted of an Iraqi promise of full disarmament, fully guaranteed by
Moscow.
But Bush rejected the proposal, saying that Hussein should go
and U.S. forces should be stationed in Iraq to "promote democracy." Bush did
tell Voloshin that Washington was interested in Moscow maintaining a back
channel with Baghdad and that the United States might be willing to entertain
new proposals from Putin and Primakov, the sources report. Moscow perceived
Bush's response as arrogant and uncompromising, which increased the leverage of
those arguing for aligning with Europe rather than the United
States.
Finally, Germany and France thus far have been successful in
persuading Putin that Russia has much more to gain from cooperation with Europe
than it does playing the doomed role of a junior U.S. ally to whom Washington
has no inclination to listen. The material grounds for this persuasion is the
fact that Germany has been the largest trade and investment partner for Russia
-- surpassing the United States. Being an equal partner in a united Europe is an
attractive option for Putin and many in the Russian elite, where 90 percent of
the population rejects a U.S. war on Iraq.
These factors together make it
unlikely that Moscow will vote even for the British amended resolution. However,
Putin still does not want to distance Russia too far from the United States, and
will continue to try to find a middle ground along the two fronts.
First, Moscow will continue to try to persuade Washington that U.S.
goals can be achieved without a war, and that Russia can help the United States
to save face if it chooses to back away from war. So new initiatives from Putin
can be expected very soon -- in time to preclude the U.S. invasion of Iraq, with
Primakov continuing his secret diplomacy with Baghdad.
Second, despite
the fact that Russia denies the need for the second U.N. resolution, Russian
diplomats will try to craft either a compromise resolution or some other form of
UNSC decision. They will cooperate with British diplomats in this effort, as
Tony Blair's government fears it could suffer should it follow Washington into
war without U.N. sanction. Moscow's assumption is that a new U.N. resolution
postponing the war could help the United States save face.
There are two
big problems with Moscow's calculations. First, the Bush administration has no
intention of backing away from war, even if the resolution fails. As for face
saving, the only thing that would damage Bush's political support more than
backing down would be if he did so under pressure from a new U.N. resolution.
The White House will submit the British amended resolution for a vote early next
week; Russia will likely join France, Germany, and China in voting against it;
and U.S. and British forces will proceed to attack Iraq.
Moscow's second
problem emerges after the war. Its decision to side with France and Germany
inevitably will damage U.S.-Russian relations. But there is no guarantee France
and Germany will be any more loyal to their new Russian ally than was the United
States. They will be looking to their own relations with Washington, and to
their own piece of the postwar Middle East. Moscow could find itself abandoned
by one set of Western allies and alienated from another. This would empower
another faction in the Kremlin: those nationalists who argue that Russia always
comes out at the short end of its attempted flirtations with the
West.
Even if France and Germany remain close to Moscow, they have done
tremendous damage to European unity. Russia's hopes of profiting with a European
powerhouse may be reduced to suffering amid European division and economic
turmoil.
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