Iran after Iraq?
By M. H. Ansari
| A U.S. that was willing to make war single-handedly is today coaxing others to share the peace-making burden. The American public may seek answers... The demonology associated with Iran therefore comes in handy. |
It is not for the first time since 1979 that many in the United States have been bent upon stepping on the Iranians' toes. The signs are more obvious in the aftermath of the Iraq War. The recent student demonstrations in Teheran and the reaction of Ali Khamenei to the situation tend to suggest that probing forays are under way.
A conclave of the "war party" in Washington last month brought together many `warriors' determined to urge the Bush administration to keep the "terror masters" in focus. Iran, they argued, was the most important country in the region. An American success there would "fundamentally transform and liberate the Middle East". The participants included likeminded `warriors', a weighty Senator, a senior person from the Israeli Defence ministry, Iranian exiles with uncertain credentials, a journalist, and a French academic of repute. For analytical purposes, it is essential to distinguish the real from the stated reasons of action.
The U.S. is no exception to this general rule. The participants waxed eloquent in the Washington seminar on the stated objectives: end of theocracy , fatal blow to terrorism, destruction of WMD capability, restoration of freedom, liberation of women and of religious and ethnic minorities and the destruction of the institution of tyranny itself in the Middle East. Interspersed in the rhetoric were three substantive reasons: secure U.S. supremacy in Iraq and Afghanistan, open the Iranian market to American business and make available Iranian territory (on U.S. terms) for the transit of Central Asian energy. These need to be considered carefully. Peace in Afghanistan and Iraq has an obvious primacy. In both places it remains elusive. Calculations have gone awry. A U.S. that was willing to make war single-handedly is today coaxing others to share the peace-making burden. The American public may seek answers, now or later, for these misperceptions and miscalculations. The demonology associated with Iran therefore comes in handy.
Iran, of course, is a neighbour of both Iraq and Afghanistan and has a potential for geopolitical mischief. Its capacity, however, is limited; the much-publicised Iranian influence on the Iraqi Shias did not help in the Iraq-Iran War. Teheran, in any case, has so far acted with responsibility in both areas, and the U.S. officials have acknowledged this on occasions.
It is understandable for the U.S., as for other countries, to seek commercial opportunities and energy security. Both these can be achieved through normal canvassing and competitive bidding. None of these is unfamiliar to the American politicians or its business community. Nothing should require surgical intervention and transplant; it must of course be said that this is precisely what the U.S. resorted to, and eventually regretted, in Iran in 1953.
The activists in the Washington seminar derived sustenance from the failure of the reform movement of Mohammad Khatami and the evident dissatisfaction among the youth who constitute about 60 per cent of the Iranian population. They urged strong measures to sustain and nurture the perceived discontent. Senator Sam Brownback was strident and assertive: "We will never be able to establish a secure and free Iraq or Afghanistan as long as the Iranian regime remains intact". The Iranians were themselves going to solve the problem: "All they need from us is strong and consistent political and moral support". This would be done through an amendment to the Senate Foreign Authorisation bill, to be called The Iran Democracy Act, and through the creation of an Iran Democracy Foundation. Both would permit funding to radio and TV stations run by Iranian expatriates in America to enhance their pro-democracy publicity, and other activities, directed at the Iranian system.
Others of the same persuasion felt that the regime would eventually go down in "spontaneous combustion" but nothing serious should be expected in the next 24 months. An entrepreneur of Iranian origin dealing with Caspian energy was specific in the anticipated results of a regime change: a demonstration of the failure of Islam as a form of governance, an opportunity to America to exploit Iran's natural resources, the opening up of the Caspian region to the world and a beneficial impact — among other things — on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
These arguments did not go unchallenged. It was pointed out that reforms have created more political space, resulted in buoyancy in the stock market and generated confidence in the business community. Most Iranians are aware of the constraints on Mr. Khatami, want change but do not want bloodshed, do not want another revolution and "want changes to happen from within".
The situation is complex and not simply one of tradition versus modernity since great many elements of modernity already exist. The inter-play is of three forces: nationality, Islam and a quest for science and technology. All three impulses are genuine and relevant. Iran is the only country that has experienced political Islam for 25 years. The ruling elite itself is not a monolith. It also knows that a new balance of forces has to be achieved. The question is not so much of getting rid of the `mullahs' as of finding a new place for them: "It is something very sophisticated and people are thinking about it".
Two sets of arguments, two sets of preferences and prognoses. The proponents of the first are Americans or Israelis and Iranians in self-imposed exile. Those of the second belong to other nationalities. Both reflect on the inner dynamics of a society; the first rejects its authenticity, the second accepts it. The role of the subjective is evident and substantiates Gary Sick's remark that with regard to Iran, Americans are trapped in a 1979 time warp. As a result, the transition, first from "revolutionary passion to revolutionary reason", and then to reason in individual and group terms, has gone unappreciated. So has the scope and intensity of debate, ranging from religion to sensitive societal matters and reflective both of a desire to change and in a measure of a functional democratic system unmatched in the region except for Turkey in recent years. To hold others as "models" of modernity and moderation is therefore intriguing.
Whatever the imperative and given the centrality of Iran, the possibility of engineered instability there has political and economic implications for several regions, including South Asia. In the Gulf, the expectation that the regime change in Iraq would put an end to the animosities of the past and usher in an era of cooperative, rather than competitive, security would receive a setback. The same would be the fate of existing trade and pipeline proposals involving transit through Iran.
It has been said that the masses go into a revolution not with a prepared plan of social reconstruction but with a sharp feeling that they cannot endure the old regime. This was true of the events of 1979 in Iran. It was then said that the revolution was not about the price of melons. Experience has shown that it was, though not exclusively so. The political evolution of Iran, and the balance between continuity and change, is a matter for the Iranian public. Preferences of others cannot be prescriptive. The decision (if taken) to extend moral, political and financial support to groups is reminiscent of language used in our own neighbourhood. The experience with Iraqi groups in exile, and of the effort to impose democracy, should be an eye opener.
(The writer is a former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.)
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