In something I was writing today, for a semi-academic publication, I
found myself inserting a paragraph about how unlikely it is that
superhuman AI's after the Singularity will possess "selves" in
anything like the sense that we humans do.

It's a bit long and out of context, but the passage in which this
paragraph occurred may be of some interest to some folks here....  The
last paragraph cited here is the one that mentions future AI's...

-- Ben

******


"
The "self" in the present context refers to the "phenomenal self"
(Metzinger, XX) or "self-model" (Epstein, XX).  That is, the self is
the model that a system builds internally, reflecting the patterns
observed in the (external and internal) world that directly pertain to
the system itself.  As is well known in everyday human life,
self-models need not be completely accurate to be useful; and in the
presence of certain psychological factors, a more accurate self-model
may not necessarily be advantageous.  But a self-model that is too
badly inaccurate will lead to a badly-functioning system that is
unable to effectively act toward the achievement of its own goals.

"
The value of a self-model for any intelligent system carrying out
embodied agentive cognition is obvious.  And beyond this, another
primary use of the self is as a foundation for metaphors and analogies
in various domains.  Patterns recognized pertaining the self are
analogically extended to other entities.  In some cases this leads to
conceptual pathologies, such as the anthropomorphization of trees,
rocks and other such objects that one sees in some precivilized
cultures.  But in other cases this kind of analogy leads to robust
sorts of reasoning – for instance, in reading Lakoff and Nunez's (XX)
intriguing explorations of the cognitive foundations of mathematics,
it is pretty easy to see that most of the metaphors on which they
hypothesize mathematics to be based, are grounded in the mind's
conceptualization of itself as a spatiotemporally embedded entity,
which in turn is predicated on the mind's having a conceptualization
of itself (a self) in the first place.

"
A self-model can in many cases form a self-fulfilling prophecy (to
make an obvious double-entendre'!).   Actions are generated based on
one's model of what sorts of actions one can and/or should take; and
the results of these actions are then incorporated into one's
self-model.  If a self-model proves a generally bad guide to action
selection, this may never be discovered, unless said self-model
includes the knowledge that semi-random experimentation is often
useful.

"
In what sense, then, may it be said that self is an attractor of
iterated forward-backward inference?  Backward inference infers the
self from observations of system behavior.  The system asks: What kind
of system might I be, in order to give rise to these behaviors that I
observe myself carrying out?   Based on asking itself this question,
it constructs a model of itself, i.e. it constructs a self.  Then,
this self guides the system's behavior: it builds new logical
relationships between its self-model and various other entities, in
order to guide its future actions oriented toward achieving its goals.
Based on the behaviors new induced via this constructive,
forward-inference activity, the system may then engage in backward
inference again and ask: What must I be now, in order to have carried
out these new actions?  And so on.

"
My hypothesis is that after repeated iterations of this sort, in
infancy, finally during early childhood a kind of self-reinforcing
attractor occurs, and we have a self-model that is resilient and
doesn't change dramatically when new instances of action- or
explanation-generation occur.   This is not strictly a mathematical
attractor, though, because over a long period of time the self may
well shift significantly.  But, for a mature self, many hundreds of
thousands or millions of forward-backward inference cycles may occur
before the self-model is dramatically modified.  For relatively long
periods of time, small changes within the context of the existing self
may suffice to allow the system to control itself intelligently.

"
Finally, it is interesting to speculate regarding how self may differ
in future AI systems as opposed to in humans.  The relative stability
we see in human selves may not exist in AI systems that can
self-improve and change more fundamentally and rapidly than humans
can.  There may be a situation in which, as soon as a system has
understood itself decently, it radically modifies itself and hence
violates its existing self-model.  Thus: intelligence without a
long-term stable self.  In this case the "attractor-ish" nature of the
self holds only over much shorter time scales than for human minds or
human-like minds.  But the alternating process of forward and backward
inference for self-construction is still critical, even though no
reasonably stable self-constituting attractor ever emerges.  The
psychology of such intelligent systems will almost surely be beyond
human beings' capacity for comprehension and empathy.
"

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