On 24/06/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Do we upload? Consider the copy paradox. If there was an exact copy of you, atom for atom, and you had to choose between killing the copy or yourself, I think you would choose to kill the copy (and the copy would choose to kill you). Does it matter who dies? Logically, no, but your instinct for self preservation says yes. You cannot resolve this paradox. Your instinct for self preservation, what you call consciousness or self-awareness, is immutable. It was programmed by your DNA. It exists because if a person does not have it, they don't live to pass on their genes. Presumably some people will choose to upload, reasoning that they will die anyway so there is nothing to lose. This is not really a satisfactory solution, because you still die. But suppose we had both read and write access to the brain, so that after copying your memory, your brain was reprogrammed to remove your fear of death. But even this is not satisfactory. Not because reprogramming is evil, but because of what you will be uploaded to. Either it will be to an AGI in a competitive system, in which case you will be back where you started (and die again), or to a cooperative system that does not fear death, and will likely fail.
I don't wish to retread old arguments, but there are a few theoretical outs. One could be uploaded bit by bit, one neuron at a time if necessary. One could be rendered unconscious, frozen, and scanned. I would find this frightening, but preferable to regaining consciousness while a separate instance of me was running. You beg the question when you ask if I would 'kill myself' if a perfect copy existed. If the copy were perfect, it would kill itself as well. If the copy were not perfect, I think I'd be entitled to declare myself a different entity. There is also the issue of modifying our own biological brains. If I come to hold a view about consciousness that is incompatible with the 'instinctive' beliefs you mention, I foresee being able to bring my instincts into line with my beliefs surgically. And no, I don't believe you 'die' when you are uploaded. I know it feels 'wrong', but unless you accept some form of dualism, I believe you are compelled to accept that you are identical with your 'state vector' (as some sci-fi writer put it, Greg Egan I think). Any divergence of vectors that may take place is a distinct issue of identity. -- Nathan Cook ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&user_secret=7d7fb4d8
