On Jun 28, 2007, at 12:56 PM, Charles D Hixson wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Yes, you would live on in one of the copies as if uploaded, and yes
the selection of which copy would be purely random, dependent on the
relative frequency of each copy (you can still define a measure to
derive probabilities even though we are talking infinite subsets of
infinite sets). What do you think would happen?
Why in only one of the copies? This is the part of the argument
that I don't understand. I accept that over time the copies would
diverge, but originally they would be substantially the same, so
why claim that the original consciousness would only be present in
one of them?
If you ask either copy afterward if they ended up
experience both existences or just one, they'll
say just one. Since there's two possibilities,
and since no single individual will experience
both at once, there's a 50% chance.
Someone on the outside could well insist that
the original person is experiencing both at once
(and many people do insist that that will be the
case), but you won't be able to find a person to
talk to who is experiencing both at once at any
given time.
--
Randall Randall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"Someone needs to invent a Bayesball bat that exists solely for
smacking people [...] upside the head." -- Psy-Kosh on reddit.com
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