On Nov 9, 2007, at 10:40 AM, Ted Hardie wrote:
I would personally be happy with that result. I think the
engineering problem
for anyone who believes it *must* apply to C is a hard one:
designing a system
which 1) allows C to intercept encrypted material 2) allows C to
present
unencrypted material to the LI requestor 3) does not require C to
ask for
the keys to every flow to hide the LI (to maintain the privacy of
the flows
not subject to the LI) and 4) does not reveal C's action to A or B.
I don't think C needs to go to that extent. All C can reasonably do
is ask A and B for the session key. If A and B are not forthcoming, C
is free to re-negotiate its peering contract between A and B. And
that's how the business works today.
If we assume that A and C are also regulated operators, then in most
jurisdictions they're going to have keys for every session, and it's
up to their regulators to decide what peers they share keys with and
what peers they don't.
--
Dean
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