...
> > 1. It's not clear to me that people are correctly parsing LI
> > requirements. I'm not an expert on CALEA, let alone laws in other
> > countries, but it's not my understanding that there is any
> > regulatory requirement that forces carriers of voice or data
> > traffic to arrange for disclosure of plaintext when they
> > don't have
> > the keys. I.e., if I buy data service from Comcast and choose to
> > run a VPN, there is no requirement that Comcast somehow
> > obtain the
> > keys to deliver them to the FBI.
> >
> > It's less clear to me what the requirements are for 3G-style
> > carriers when the endpoints are doing the crypto. I.e., I'm quite
> > certain that if AT&T terminates the crypto they need to
> > provide the
> > plaintext on request, but a lot less certain that they need to
> > provide the plaintext if the crypto is end-to-end.
>
> Timothy Dwight posted a followup on 3GPP's requirement that should
> be helpful on those points. What remains unsaid in that quoted text
> is crypto performed by the endpoint itself (as with DTLS-SRTP).
Tim mentioned to me privately that his posting to SIP is being held
up; here is the content:
From: Dwight, Timothy M (Tim) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Eric Rescorla; Dan Wing
Cc: IETF SIP List
Subject: RE: [Sip] media-security-requirements and lawful intercept
On point #1, 3GPP 33.106 says under "Security of Processes":
"NWOs/APs/SvPs shall not be responsible for decrypting, or
ensuring the LEA's ability to decrypt, any communication
encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption
was provided by the NWOs/APs/SvPs and the NWOs/APs/SvPs
possesses the information necessary to decrypt the
communication or the NWOs/ APs/SvPs provides encryption keys
but does not provide the encryption itself. In the case that
the NWOs/ APs/SvPs provides encryption keys to the subscriber
or customer but does not provide the encryption itself, the
NWOs/ APs/SvPs shall provide the keys to the LEA if required
by national regulations."
The same text is found in ETSI TISPAN TS 133 106.
tim
-d
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