Hi Dan, MUST specify, SHOULD implement and MAY use seems fine for me.
I can imagine that not only end hosts would benefit from this mechanisms. There are two mechanisms that offered slightly different functionality regarding this security context reuse, namely * Re-use of a previously established security context based on state that has been established by both end points * Re-use of a previously established security context by caching security context only on the client side. I can imagine that both approaches are useful in certain scenarios. The requirement does not differentiate these two cases. Ciao Hannes Dan Wing wrote: > In draft-ietf-sip-media-security-requirements-02, I changed the following > requirement from MAY to MUST: > > R-REUSE The media security key management protocol MUST support the > re-use of a previously established security context, and > implementations SHOULD implement the re-use mechanism. > > A discussion of this requirement appears in Section 4.6 of the document, > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-media-security-requirements-02#secti > on-4.6 > > > Does anyone have equipment that they would implement this feature in? In the > past, I have heard that some embedded devices (intelligent SIMs) could benefit > from key re-use. > > Would it be reasonable to soften this requirement back to a MAY? > > -d > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Sip mailing list http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip > This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol > Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip > Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip > _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip
