On Feb 20, 2008, at 6:35 AM, Paul Kyzivat wrote: > Dean, > > I don't think I agree. > > In the non-anonymous case, the asserter will attest that the source > is entitled to claim the address. AFAIK nothing else is implied. But > assume it will provide more - for instance the name, address, and > SS# of the person entitled to the address. > > Now assume that the address is an "anonymous" address. The asserter > will then be providing information about the anonymizer, not the > entity that is being anonymized. Its entirely possible (likely) that > the anonymizer won't maintain records that would give it the > capability of reporting on the address being anonymized.
Well then in most jurisdictions it can go to jail for contempt of court when it can't respond to the court order. Seriously, you really shouldn't be acting as an identity service if you have no way to validate the identity being asserted against. It's like notarizing a signature on a document without checking the signer's ID. In other words, the anonymizer and the identity service MUST be integrated. The identity service needs to perform an identity verification check on the user BEFORE anonymizing, if it's going to act as an identity service for that user. Slapping an identity record on something that's been anonymized elsewhere is worse than useless. -- Dean _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip
