At Wed, 9 Apr 2008 18:10:05 -0700,
Dan Wing wrote:

> >    before the SDP answer arrives) might make the requirements 
> > to become
> >    obsolete, but at the time of writing no progress has been
> > 
> > Not sure I know what this means: "to become obsolete" seems 
> > ungramattical here. 
> 
> Changed to:
> 
>   Preventing the arrival of early media (i.e., media that 
>   arrives at the SDP offerer before the SDP answer arrives) 
>   might obsolete the R-AVOID-CLIPPING requirement, but at the 
>   time of writing such early media exists in many normal call 
>   scenarios.

Looks good.


> > S 4.3.
> > The entire section on shared key conferencing doesn't lead to any
> > requirements as far as I can tell. Does it make sense to remove
> > it from this document?
> 
> Right.  It seems useful to leave it in, as mentioned at the beginning
> of the section:
> 
>    The consensus on the RTPSEC mailing list was to concentrate on
>    unicast, point-to-point sessions.  Thus, there are no requirements
>    related to shared key conferencing.  This section is retained for
>    informational purposes.
> 
> if others agree it should be removed, I can remove it.

I've got no real problem with leaving it in, I just wanted
to note it.

> > S 5.3.
> >    R-OTHER-SIGNALING:
> >          A solution SHOULD be able to negotiate keys for SRTP sessions
> >          created via different call signaling protocols (e.g., between
> >          Jabber, SIP, H.323, MGCP).
> > 
> > This is not discussed anywhere in the document. I wonder if it makes
> > sense to remove it.
> 
> I know that my employer's products interwork between SIP and MGCP (and 
> our proprietary SCCP) with SRTP today -- all using Security Descriptions.
> 
> I know we have a need to meet this requirement with anything that 
> replaces our Security Descriptions implementations.  I expect others
> do, too.  
> 
> Would adding motivating text (in a new subsection 4.xxx) be useful?  I
> had assumed the need was self-evident.

As a matter of form, I think it would be good to have a section
with motivating text.


> > S A.1.12.2.
> > The issues you raise about middleboxes and clipping apply equally
> > to DTLS-SRTP and ZRTP, no?
> 
> ZRTP allows RTP to flow while the ZRTP exchange is happening, so ZRTP
> should incur no clipping.

> > S A.1.13.1.
> > The way you're using "public key cryptography" to mean "PKI" is not
> > the normal terminology. DH is PKC. I would use PKI to indicate
> > "certs are needed". So, for instance, SDP-DH and ZRTP definitely use
> > PKC.
> 
> Ok.  Changed from:
> 
>    Using public key cryptography for confidentiality and authentication
>    can introduce requirements for two types of systems: (1) a system to
>    distribute public keys (often in the form of certificates), and (2) a
>    system for validating certificates.
> 
> to:
> 
>    Requiring certificates for confidentiality and authentication 
>    can introduce requirements for two types of systems: (1) a system to 
>    distribute certificates, and (2) a system for validating certificates. 

Looks good.

> > I don't know what "exponential or discrete logarithmic key exchange"
> > means. After all, RSA involves exponentiation. Presumably you mean
> > "something with ephemeral keys". This currently means discrete log
> > over integer and elliptic curve fields, but could be RSA in principle.
> 
> Thanks.  I don't know where that text came from (it isn't my wording
> but it was in my original -00).  Changed to:
> 
>       DTLS-SRTP
>          PFS is provided if the negotiated cipher suite uses ephemeral
>          keys (e.g., Diffie-Hellman (DH_RSA from [RFC4346]) or Elliptic
>          Curve Diffie-Hellman [RFC4492]).

s/DH_RSA/DHE_RSA/. DH_RSA means static keys.


> > S A.1.13.3.
> > It's probably important to indicate that it is desirable to have
> > the profile be RTP/SAVP when SRTP is used. That's a disadvantage
> > of media path probing, for instance. I don't think that comes
> > across clearly here.
> 
> There is a disadvantage with RTP/SAVP as the profile, as well, mentioned at
> the beginning of that section -- just prior to the list of candidate
> techniques.  
> 
> This section is titled Best Effort Encryption, and RTP/SAVP is not a candidate
> technique to provide best effort encryption -- RTP/SAVP causes a call to fail
> to complete if any of the remote forks or targets (during retargeting) rejects
> the call because they don't understand that profile.  This is discussed at the
> beginning of that section, in order to justify why we need best effort
> encryption -- so that we can deploy SRTP without a priori knowledge of the
> called party's deployment of RTP/SAVP-capable endpoints at that particular
> moment.

So, maybe I just misunderstood the situation: I had thought that 
with the new media cap stuff one would offer both RTP/SAVP and
RTP/AVP, so you would get best effort. Am I confused?

> > I guess RSA matters, but
> > since we negotiate a separate protection profile for SRTP, 3DES/SHA
> > isn't that relevant. Btw, TLS 1.2. will be AES.
> 
> Thanks, changed to:
> 
>    This document assumes DTLS will use TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as
>    its cipher suite, which is the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite in
>    TLS [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].
> 
> > Note also that DTLS-SRTP is compatible with RTP before the DTLS
> > handshake.
> 
> Only if the RTP profile is RTP/AVP; if the profile is RTP/SAVP, one expects
> only SRTP.  Is there text that needs to change to note that in the
> requirements doc?

Not sure. See my comment above about RTP/SAVP.

-Ekr
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