> -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Dan > Wing > > The chain would be good, but I would be happy with the first link: > who (claims to have) injected the message into the SIP network. Even > if the message transited over some itty-bitty ITSP in a country I had > never heard of, it wouldn't matter if I could verify the identity of > who injected the message into the SIP 'cloud'.
That was kinda my thought for the P-Asserter draft - as much as preventing all mitm cases would be great, not having anything is far worse. Most of my customers don't care about preventing mitm for identity; if there's a malicious mitm, wrong identity is the *least* of their problems. What they care more about (I think) is lying originators, open relays, and the like. In other words they want to prevent SPAM and Phishing and such. Having a proof of signaling originator Identity alone (ie, the From or something similar) with replay protection and non-repudiation is sufficient for them - they don't need SDP identity, or Call-Id Identity, or CSeq Identity. -hadriel _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip
