Brian,

On Nov 6, 2008, at 12:44 PM, Brian Rosen wrote:

In fact, if there was a way to guarantee the protocol wouldn't work without
TLS, I'd prefer to do that.

I'm tired of marketing folks looking to save a buck of development costs slicing off security and foisting insecure implementations on unsuspecting consumers, only to be among the loudest voices slamming their engineering guys for why the security fix is necessary or can't be done yesterday when
the problems show up.

DY> Wearing my "security" hat, I completely agree with you. It has seemed to me that in the past various protocols have gone out with security only an afterthought (if at all), resulting in something having to be baked on later. So there's no argument from me on this point. In my ideal world, it's all "secure" from the start.

DY> David was advancing two use cases where security is, in his opinion, not really required and was advocating for having a non-TLS mode of the protocol. Wearing my "product manager" hat, I can see his points .

DY> My argument is that either: 1) security like TLS should be a MUST in the protocol; or 2) it should be carved out into a separate RFC that can be referenced and implemented.

DY> What we don't need are "SHOULD"s that will effectively mean that the security protection is never implemented.

Dan

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Dan York, CISSP, Director of Emerging Communication Technology
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