Hadriel Kaplan wrote:
Actually, I would debate that. Derive and other return-routability checks have the property of: "if I pass then you know I'm good, if I fail then you know nothing (neither good nor bad)". I would argue such a property is only useful in voice communications if it passes and provides a positive/"good" result *frequently*.
Well, I don't think really this is specific to DERIVE -- most of communication technologies are useful only if used frequently. (economists call it networking I recall). The starting point is obviously zero, the key challenge is a growth strategy and I thinkt the key to it
is simplicity.
For example, if the odds of Derive passing is low in general, then Palin would have had to assume it *was* Sarkozy even if it failed. Why? Because she assumes it now, with no such checking, and the odds of this thing passing are low per the supposition.
DERIVE can't do social engineering. DERIVE only verifies routeability. DERIVE helps her to trust [EMAIL PROTECTED] if she knows it is a legitimate address. If she accepts [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a positive DERIVE test, and dislikes she knows after fact
she can put the URI on a blacklist. -jiri
Therefore, if we feel the odds of a return-routability check succeeding is low in general, it is NOT the case that: "it greatly decreases the probability of a random radio DJ being able to make a prank call." -hadriel
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