[4 articles]

Danger Really Was His Middle Name

http://www.cornellsun.com/section/arts/content/2010/04/08/danger-really-was-his-middle-name

April 8, 2010
By Hannah Stamler

The story of RAND employee-turned-activist Daniel Ellsberg is a famous one, especially for the Baby Boomer generation. But in new documentary by Judith Elrich (The Good War And Those Who Refused to Fight It) and Rick Goldsmith (Tell the Truth And Run: George Seldes and the American Press), Ellsberg is reintroduced to the public more than 35 years after he first made headlines. 2010 Academy Award nominee for Best Documentary Feature The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers is an intimate and engaging look into the life of Ellsberg, and the effect that the Vietnam War and the leaking of the Pentagon Papers had on his life and the lives of those involved.

The film splices between archival footage, interviews with Ellsberg and his friends and family, and interviews with politicians and historians, notably the late Howard Zinn. It is half history, half personal retrospective.

As Ellsberg explains in the beginning the film, in his youth he never could have imagined that he would come be involved in anything like the Pentagon Papers scandal. A Harvard grad in Economics and an officer in the Marine Corps, Ellsberg joined the RAND Corporation ­ a think tank designed to supplement research and analysis to the U.S. Armed Forces ­ as one of its most promising young employees. At RAND, among other work, Ellsberg was assigned a research project the results of which contributed to major escalations in bombing campaigns in North Vietnam under President Johnson.

It was not until Ellsberg heard senior officials contradict to the press a report that he had just before delivered about the nonsuccess of the war that he became officially disenchanted. This pivotal moment, coupled with exposure to the raging anti-war movement in Washington, turned Ellsberg completely against the war. Inspired by draft resisters, and supported by friend and former RAND colleague Anthony Russo, Ellsberg decided to leak top-secret reports to The New York Times.

The papers, officially named "United States­Vietnam Relations, 1945­1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense," was a study detailing U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945. Released in 1971, the papers revealed the true aims of U.S. in Vietnam, and showed that four administrations had deliberately deceived the American people.

Though, much to Ellsberg's dismay, the release of the Pentagon Papers in The New York Times and other major publications did not immediately end the war, they had far-reaching effects that Mr. Ellsberg himself could have predicted. Ellsberg's trial led to the famous decision of the New York Times Co. v. United States case and some of the measures taken by Nixon to prevent further leaks would feed into the Watergate burglaries, and ultimately the end of Nixon's presidency.

Unlike a History Channel special, or the previous film The Pentagon Papers, The Most Dangerous Man in America is, as the title promises, more about Ellsberg than just the Pentagon Papers. Though the thudding "ominous" music is at times unnecessary, Elrich and Goldsmith have done a good job making sure that the story of Ellsberg doesn't get swallowed up in spectacle. The interviews with Ellsberg are stripped and honest, and at times the film veers off into effective personal anecdotes.

Instead of a close-up look at the Pentagon Papers affair, or Ellsberg's life during his mid-30s when he released the papers, Elrich and Goldsmith allow viewers to get a full understanding of him, greater than an exhaustive history lesson, or Ellsberg's occasional recent guest-spots on television news, give. The viewers are able to see the Vietnam War and the Pentagon Papers leakage for what they really were ­ not just moments in Ellsberg's life, but memories that simply cannot be forgotten.

Indeed, for Ellsberg, as the film makes clear, the guilt and horror that he felt as a young man about his early involvement in the war is a fact that has affected him into his old age. On a more inspiring note, these same experiences have also turned him into a life-long activist, crusading now against involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. And though the parallels between Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan are drawn quite clearly, they are never forced. Elrich and Goldsmith realized, quite rightly, that Ellsberg's life story was enough to inspire. Like the quiet, yet firm voice of Ellsberg himself, The Most Dangerous Man in America makes its point but is never too brazen.

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Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers

The Most Dangerous Man in the World

http://www.counterpunch.org/landau04092010.html

By SAUL LANDAU
April 9 - 11, 2010

In 2005, teaching a history class to university juniors and seniors, I mentioned the Vietnam War. I noticed glazed looks in the eyes of several students. I asked a young woman born about a decade after that war had ended: "You know when the Vietnam War occurred, right?"

She wrinkled her brow, bit her lip and said, hesitatingly: "Wasn't it after the Greco-Roman era?"

Some students knew, but most were unsure. Neither parents nor teachers had taught them recent history. A new film will now help fill that void.

"The Most Dangerous Man in America" (produced by Judith Ehrlich and Rick Goldsmith; photography by Vicente Franco) earned his film title from those in the heights of power--not by robbing banks or committing serial murders; rather, he revealed US government secrets.

Ironically, our enemies (the Soviet Union and China at the time) had no interest in the "top secret" documents Daniel Ellsberg (the film's narrator) leaked to the media and Congress in 1971 as "The Pentagon Papers." The US public, however, should have responded to the contents of those seven thousand super classified pages with shock and anger.

The Papers showed the government had lied to Congress and the public about its reasons for invading Vietnam. The Papers also demonstrated that behind the "stop communism from causing Asian nations to topple like dominoes" rhetoric lay deeper US imperial ambitions that policy makers had pushed for fifteen years. Presidents Johnson and Nixon didn't send men to die for freedom or for any moral purpose.

When the NY Times and subsequently other major papers published these Papers, their editorials did not stress the outrage they and all citizens should have felt over official prevarication and manipulation. Instead of calling for immediate withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, in light of the truth that neither the Soviets nor Chinese controlled the Vietnamese communists and that Vietnam posed no domino threat in Asia, the newspapers patted themselves on the back for their "courage" in daring to print classified documents.

None called for indictments of Presidents Nixon and Johnson and their underlings for committing countless criminal acts designed to defraud the public by secretly pursuing an offensive imperial policy.

Official US combat troops landed after the war elite had rigged the 1964 "Tonkin Gulf incident." Vietnamese war ships supposedly attacked US ships in international water ­ they didn't -- which Johnson used to sell Congress on the need to send the US armed forces to Vietnam. A decade earlier, the White House, CIA and DoD were already intervening to prevent Vietnamese independence and unity.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urged Eisenhower to drop a nuclear bomb on the Vietnamese forces that surrounded the French armies. Ike said he would have to consult the allies before taking such a step ­ meaning "no."

The French surrendered and at the 1954 French-Vietnamese Geneva talks pledged free elections to unify Vietnam.

In his memoirs, Eisenhower admits that "80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai" (Mandate for Change, p. 372). Bao was the US-backed head of the temporary state of South Vietnam. Until 1954, Washington had born the brunt of funding the French military endeavor and, as the Pentagon Papers made clear, Washington had no intention of allowing elections that would make Ho the President of a united and communist-led Vietnam.

In the film, Ellsberg, a gung-ho ex Marine and anti-communist zealot, plays a role in planning US military strategy in Vietnam. He even goes to the country gun in hand to kill commies. Then, Ellsberg has second thoughts and meets his love, the very anti-war Patricia Marx, who helps convince him of his errors.

With equal fervor, Ellsberg began planning anti-war strategy: stealing secret papers from his Rand think tank offices. Rand was preparing a prognosis on the war for the military elite. After Ellsberg delivered these Papers to the media, he expected the "aware" public to stop the war and throw the bums out.

Nixon and Kissinger considered Ellsberg "dangerous" for leaking the classified papers. Like Ellsberg, they believed an enlightened public should have risen in anger, stopped the war and reversed policies based on secrecy and duplicity. But the majority of the American public still doesn't know why the US fought in Vietnam; nor do they care.

Professors might use this film to enlighten curious students. After all, the government repeated its Vietnam perfidies and crimes in Central America in the 1980s and continues the deception in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Indeed, millions demonstrated against the Iraq War ­ to no avail. Even when the public discovered Bush and Cheney had misled them, nothing happened to the criminals in chief. A challenge to the citizenry: aware of high crimes and misdemeanors, how to stop them and reverse course?

Perhaps Ellsberg reveals the film's deeper lesson: becoming an actor on the stage of one's own history makes life interesting.

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The Most Dangerous Man in America

http://www.americamagazine.org/blog/entry.cfm?blog_id=2&entry_id=2697

2010-03-29
by John Coleman, S.J.

I was rooting, at Oscar time, for the documentary, "The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers," to win for best documentary (in the event, another good film, "The Cove," won). Those who remember Errol Morris' 2004 Oscar-winning documentary, "The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara," will note resemblances, in places, with "The Most Dangerous Man," even to the extraordinary length of their titles.

At one point in "The Most Dangerous Man," Ellsberg, who had worked closely with McNamara, corroborates McNamara's claim, in "The Fog of War," that he, fairly early on, told President Johnson to pull back from bombings in Viet Nam. Ellsberg recounts his own aversion, however, when, just at the very time McNamara was expressing to him doubts about the war, he appeared on TV, spouting spin­lies about the military progress being, then, made. Ellsberg had, toward the beginning of the Viet Nam war, authored, for McNamara, a sensationalistic account of a soldier's torture by the North Vietnamese which bolstered McNamara's initial support for the war. The Most Dangerous Man comes across almost as a cliff-hanger suspense drama. One film critic has speculated that "in another time and culture, a story of this scale would deserve an opera."

I met Ellsberg once, by chance, as we were both waiting in line at a Berkeley drug-store, pharmacy (It having been Berkeley, I may have just needed to add that clarification: pharmacy!). I introduced myself to him as a Jesuit priest and a long-time admirer of his anti-war work. I also told him that I had a nodding acquaintance with his son, Robert (the editor of the Catholic Orbis Press). Robert shows up in the film, both as a teenager (in old footage) and as an adult. Ellsberg pressed his two children into yeoman's service, helping him, secretly, photo-copy the 7,000 pages of The Pentagon Papers. Not surprisingly, Ellsberg's former wife, their mother, was not so pleased.

The epithet, "The most dangerous man in America" was bestowed as a sobriquet on Ellsberg by Henry Kissinger. The two men knew each other quite well. In a profound sense, the movie is about a transformation that was not just political but spiritual. Ellsberg, not the most cuddly guy nor the most lovable, is, nevertheless, someone who is exacting and rigorous. He shows little sympathy for moral weakness (least of all his own). He was also endowed with a strategic cunning. The film recounts the biography of a man of conviction and courage who risked everything, freedom, family, friends and career for his principles.

Most of us enact bad orders, alas, all too well. It is relatively rare for anyone, working at any level in the public or private sector, to give such priority to conscience over career­or over a pay check. I referenced the documentary, a week ago, when I was presenting an adult faith formation lecture in our parish on Ignatian Discernment. I had been using an excellent book by Dean Brackley, The Call to Discernment in Troubled Times, which talks about cultural biases, collective obstacles to freedom and an integral discernment. The documentary shows a man who had to buck his closest colleagues, old friends and his initial variant of patriotism, in the name of conscience and true patriotism.

Efficiently wedding archival footage to contemporary interviews, "The Most Dangerous Man" tells the story of an initial Cold Warrior, hired to feed rationales for expanding the war to his boss, Robert McNamara. His transformation from hawk to dove came slowly. Ellsberg, who had earlier in his career been one of the youngest Marine commanding officers, made personal visits to the Mekong jungle battlefields. The illuminating moment came when he realized that the war was not truly winnable and would involve many civilian and military casualties. He came to see that its prosecution, even escalation, was more about "saving face" for America than for any true strategic purpose. Working at the Rand Corporation, he read the Pentagon papers which documented a continuous fabric of public lies about Viet Nam, stretching through the Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon administrations.

Ever, in his deepest bones, a patriot, Ellsberg now says of his actions: "I realized I wasn't discharging my responsibility by keeping these secrets." Still, he weighed­old cold warrior and Pentagon think-tanker that we was­issues of national security. Initially, he sent copies of the purloined Pentagon Papers to anti-war Senators Fulbright and McGovern. He argued that they, as senators, could use the material, free from any prosecution. They sat on the material and did not seem to act. Then, and only then, did he leak the papers to 17 different newspapers, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Boston Globe.

The documentary makes much of how the Supreme Court, in a landmark 1971 decision for free-speech (New York Times Vs. United States), upheld the papers' right to publish. One listens in horror, during the documentary, to tapes from the Nixon White House, where the sitting president tells Henry Kissinger to consider a nuclear option in Viet Nam and that he, Nixon, was not concerned about civilian casualties. The Nixon tapes also disclose his plans for Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt to break into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office to garner confidential and potentially incriminating material. Ellsberg was arrested for felony treason under the Espionage Act of 1917. During the trial, it became apparent that the government had authorized a break-in to Lewis Fielding's (Ellsberg's psychiatrist) office, and had conducted wire-taps on Ellsberg without authorization. John Ehrlichman had even approached Judge William Byrne during the 1973 trial of Ellsberg, offering him a high government post. The Judge ultimately dismissed the trial and said: "The totality of the circumstances of this case offend a sense of justice. The bizarre events have incurably infected the prosecution of this case."

I came away from the documentary with both a sense of hope and some gloom. My hope rested on the fact that one man of conscience and principle can make a difference. My hope lay in the importance and power of newspapers to hold our government accountable. One irony in the film, however, was that the mere release of the Pentagon papers became much bigger news than their actual content. Despite their release, Richard Nixon got re-elected in 1972 by a landslide. The populist tone of the film leaves also something of a bitter aftertaste which hints that, when we ignore the details, we only ensure that they will be repeated. Repeated they were with the immoral invasion of Iraq and the dubious cover-ups of the Bush administration. As one movie critic noted: "Anyone with any doubt of the importance, in a functioning democracy, of American newspapers­with working newsrooms full of professional, paid journalists­needs to see this movie." Alas, many of America's newspapers, today, are struggling to keep afloat. Just maybe, John Adams who wrote a majestic opera, "Doctor Atomic," about another war-tinged figure, J. Robert Oppenheimer, might be induced to write that opera the Ellsberg story deserves.

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"The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers" Review

http://thefastertimes.com/film/2010/03/30/the-most-dangerous-man-in-america-daniel-ellsberg-and-the-pentagon-papers-review/

March 30, 2010
Jonathan Kiefer

Here's an irony: It wasn't until after he'd left the Marine Corps and forfeited his job as a 1960s Defense Department policy analyst, which is to say a professional maker of war, that Daniel Ellsberg ever struck anybody as dangerous. And not just anybody, but Henry Kissinger, who at the time was taking heat from Richard Nixon for not thinking big enough to consider a nuclear option in Vietnam. What a world.

Later Nixon would record his hope that Americans "quit making heroes out of those who steal secrets and publish them in the newspapers." To which Berkeley filmmakers Judith Erlich and Rick Goldsmith now say: Tough luck, eh Dick? In the estimation of Erlich and Goldsmith's Oscar-nominated documentary, "The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers," we're actually way overdue to rev that particular hero-making engine up again.

Ellsberg, lest we forget, is among the most unambiguously influential whistleblowers in American history ­ a man whose public radicalization from dutiful hawk to dove of conscience seems inherently movie-worthy. James Spader played him on TV a few years ago, but really it ought to have been a big-screen part for Paul Newman, whom the young Ellsberg resembled and apparently admired, and who became unavailable by dying in 2008. Pragmatically, Erlich and Goldsmith have just gone ahead and let the real man tell his own story. It's a story good enough to withstand the conventional documentary formula of archive footage and talking heads ­ and maybe even good enough to withstand a few ill-advised sprinkles of hokey music, animation and reenactments.

In addition to personally whipping up the specious pretext for LBJ's Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and subsequent aggression in Vietnam, Ellsberg also had a demoralizing experience of his own on the ground there, whereupon he inquired of a fellow Marine, "You ever feel like the Redcoats?" On Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's Vietnam history task force, he ascended through stages of security clearance as if through stages of grief ­ sussing out "a pattern of presidential lying" that had metastasized across five administrations, and gradually coming to terms with the bitter truth left in its wake. "It wasn't just that we were on the wrong side," Ellsberg concluded. "We were the wrong side." Soon enough, in 1971, 7,000 pages of top-secret CIA documents supporting this analysis found their way into the New York Times, setting a dramatic First Amendment precedent and steering a fiendishly paranoid president straight toward his destiny of self-ruination.

This should not imply a path of least resistance. Whether you call it treason or civil disobedience, what Ellsberg did sure as hell wasn't easy. Enlisting his own children and last remaining Rand Corporation friend Anthony Russo to photocopy all those pages in the middle of the night was just the beginning. Ellsberg's appeals for attention to outwardly antiwar lawmakers including William Fulbright and George McGovern went neglected; only Alaska senator Mike Gravel, alone and increasingly overcome by exhaustion and emotion, dared to read the Pentagon Papers into the Congressional Record.

The Times, meanwhile, had taken its time vetting the material and considering the implications of making it public. One implication, manifested right away, was an injunction from Nixon's Justice Department against further publication. Meanwhile, other dailies passed the story around and kept it burning, like an Olympic torch. But eventually, perhaps inevitably, the substance of the Pentagon Papers seemed less important than the sensation of their release. It's important to remember that before resigning in disgrace, Nixon got reelected in a landslide, while the war Ellsberg helped launch raged lethally on. And never mind the disastrous déjà vu in Iraq a generation later. It's the irony that keeps on giving!

Gloom enthusiasts may recall that McNamara's own retrospective self-inventory made for compelling documentary fodder in Errol Morris' "The Fog of War" ­ by contrast to which, Erlich and Goldsmith's hagiographic portrait of a clever, handsome, righteous radical does seem less essential. Is it morbid and cruel to want more on the family tragedy that spurred Ellsberg's sensitivity to fatally inattentive authority figures? Or to want at least some resistance to his privileged narration? Ellsberg's still active as an activist; can't we let him stay at least a little dangerous?

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