WASHINGTON -- Rolf Ekeus, living proof that not all Swedish arms inspectors
are fools, may have been right.
Ekeus headed the U.N. inspection team that from 1991 to 1997 uncovered not
just tons of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq, but a massive secret
nuclear weapons program as well. This, after the other Swede, Hans Blix, then
director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, had given Saddam a
perfectly clean bill of health on being non-nuclear. Indeed, Iraq was sitting
on the IAEA Board of Governors.
Ekeus theorizes that Saddam decided years ago that keeping mustard gas and
other poisons in barrels was unstable and corrosive, and also hard to conceal.
Therefore, rather than store large stocks of weapons of mass destruction, he
would adapt the program to retain an infrastructure (laboratories, equipment,
trained scientists, detailed plans) that could ``break out'' and ramp up
production when needed. The model is Japanese ``just in time'' manufacturing,
where you save on inventory by making and delivering stuff in immediate
response to orders. Except that Saddam's business was toxins, not Toyotas.
The interim report of chief U.S. weapons inspector David Kay seems to
support the Ekeus hypothesis. He found infrastructure, but as yet no finished
product.
As yet, mind you. ``We are not yet at the point where we can say
definitively either that such weapons stocks do not exist or that they existed
before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone,'' Kay
testified last week.
This is fact, not fudging. How do we know? Because Saddam's practice was to
store his chemical weapons unmarked amid his conventional munitions, and we
have just begun to understand the staggering scale of Saddam's stocks of
conventional munitions. Saddam left behind 130 known ammunition caches, many
of which are more than twice the size of Manhattan. Imagine looking through
``600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs and other
ordnance'' -- rows and rows stretched over an area the size of even one
Manhattan -- looking for a few barrels of unmarked chemical
weapons.
And there are 130 of these depots. Kay's team has up to now inspected only
10. The question of whether Saddam actually retained finished product is still
open.
But the question of whether Saddam was still in the WMD business is no
longer open. ``We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities,''
Kay testified, ``and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from
the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002'' --
concealed, that is, from the hapless Hans Blix.
Kay's list is chilling. It includes a secret network of labs and safe
houses within the Mukhabarat, the Iraqi intelligence service; bioorganisms
kept in scientists' homes, including a vial of live botulinum; and my
favorite, ``new research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean
Hemorrhagic Fever, and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin'' -- all ``not
declared to the U.N.''
I have been to medical school, and I have never heard of Congo Crimean
Hemorrhagic Fever. I don't know one doctor in 100 who has. It is an extremely
rare disease, and you can be sure that Saddam was not seeking a cure.
He was not after the Nobel in physiology (Yasser Arafat having already won
the peace prize). He was looking for a way to turn these agents into killers.
The fact that he was not stockpiling is relevant only to the question of why
some prewar intelligence was wrong about Iraq's WMD program. But it is not
relevant to the question of whether a war to pre-empt his development of WMDs
was justified.
The fact that Saddam may have decided to go from building up stocks to
maintaining clandestine production facilities (may have: remember, Kay still
has 120 depots to go through)
does not mean that he got out of the WMD business. Otherwise, by that
logic, one would have to say that until the very moment at which the plutonium
from its 8,000 processed fuel rods are wedded to waiting nuclear devices,
North Korea does not have a nuclear program.
Saddam was simply making his WMD program more efficient and concealable.
His intent and capacity were unchanged.
Moreover, for those who care about the U.N. (I do not, but many
administration critics have a weakness for legal niceties), Resolution 1441,
unanimously passed by the Security Council, ordered Saddam to make full
accounting of his WMD program and to cooperate with inspectors, and warned
that there would be no more tolerance for concealment or obstruction. Kay's
finding of ``dozens of WMD-related program activities,'' concealed from U.N.
inspectors, constitutes an irrefutable material breach of 1441 -- and
open-and-shut vindication of the U.S. decision to disarm Saddam by force.
Q.E.D.
Print
Send